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EXPERIMENTAL TESTS OF A SEQUENTIAL EQUILIBRIUM 
REPUTATION MODEL 
BY COLIN CAMERER AND KEITH WEIGELT1 
We test whether a model of reputation formation in an incomplete information game, 
using sequential equilibrium, predicts behavior of players in an experiment. Subjects play 
an abstracted lending game: a B player lends or does not lend; then if B lends, an E 
player can pay back or renege. The game is played 8 times, and there is a small controlled 
probability that the E player's induced preferences make him prefer to pay back (but 
usually he prefers to renege). In sequential equilibrium, even E players who prefer to 
renege should pay back in early periods of the game, and renege with increasing frequency 
in later periods, to establish reputations for preferring to pay back. After many repetitions 
of the 8-period game, actual play is roughly like the sequential equilibrium, except that E 
players pay back later in the game and more often than they should. This behavior is 
rational if B players have a "homemade" prior probability of .17 (in addition to the 
controlled probability) that E players will prefer to pay back. We conclude that sequential 
equilibrium with homemade incomplete information describes actual behavior well enough 
that it is plausible to apply it to theoretical settings where individuals make choices (e.g., 
product markets, labor markets, bargaining). 
KEYwoRDs: Experiments, sequential equilibrium, reputation, incomplete information. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
WE TEST WHETHER a sequential equilibrium model of reputation formation in an 
incomplete information repeated game predicts behavior of players in an experi- 
ment. After subjects have experience their play is roughly like the sequential 
equilibrium, except they seem to have a "homemade" belief about the prior 
probability of the other players' payoff type, in addition to the prior probability 
we created in the experiments. 
The mathematical analysis of reputations in repeated games with incomplete 
information is one of the most fertile areas of current research in mathematical 
social science (see Wilson's 1985 review). These games assume incomplete infor- 
mation about players' "types" (privately known characteristics). The common 
belief about a player's type is the player's reputation. In such games, modellers 
usually search for "sequential equilibria" (SE; Kreps and Wilson, 1982a)-equi- 
libria in which play is rational in every subgame of play from any point to the 
end (as in "subgame perfect" equilibria; Selten, 1975). In SE, beliefs about 
players' types are updated based on play before each subgame, using Bayes' rule 
when possible. 
In many games, reputations seem to form even though complete-information 
theories (assuming perfection) predict otherwise-players cooperate in the 
finitely-repeated prisoners' dilemma, for instance (Kreps, et al., 1982; cf. Axelrod, 
1982), and firms deter entry (Kreps and Wilson, 1982b; Milgrom and Roberts, 
1 Thanks to James Friedman, Charles Holt, David Kreps, Robert Wilson, two anonymous referees, 
and participants at the 1986 Public Choice Society Meetings, the 1986 Summer Econometric Society 
Meetings, the University of Iowa, New York University, and the Wharton Decision Processes bag 
lunch seminar, for comments. This research was funded by the New York University Center for 
Entrepreneurial Studies. 
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1982). Empirical reputation-building can be rationalized by assuming that people 
play SE with certain kinds of incomplete information. However, equilibria which 
rationalize reputation-building are often so complicated that it is reasonable to 
ask whether people actually play SE in naturally-occurring games. This question 
is important given the increasing popularity of theories in which individuals are 
assumed to use SE (or similarly complicated equilibria) to make decisions under 
incomplete information-in product markets (e.g., Allen, 1984), in labor markets 
(e.g., Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984), and in bargaining settings (e.g., Fudenberg, 
Levine, and Tirole, 1985; Rubinstein, 1985). It is not unreasonable to think that 
firms might play elaborate games rationally (perhaps by hiring consultants or 
pooling knowledge), but it seems less plausible that individuals can calculate SE. 
Of course, SE is not necessarily meant to describe how people play games, but in 
many applications individual agents are assumed to play SE. If SE does not 
describe individual play in simple games, perhaps we should be skeptical about 
the application of SE to more complex settings like product markets, labor 
markets, and bargaining. 
The assumptions underlying sequential equilibrium theories of reputation- 
building-such as common knowledge about the game, including the incomplete 
information-are hard to verify in natural settings. Therefore, we test SE in 
laboratory experiments, where we can create an information structure which 
satisfies the assumptions of SE. 
Many others have experimented on reputation formation in economic settings. 
Miller and Plott (1985) found that sellers in experimental product markets 
developed reputations for selling high-quality products, and commanded pre- 
mium prices for doing so (as predicted by Klein and Leffler (1981), Shapiro 
(1983), et al.). DeJong, et al. (1985) found similar results in an agency setting; 
and Daughety and Forsythe (1987a, 1987b) found reputation-building in experi- 
mental duopolies. Roth and Schoumaker (1983) found that past histories of 
players, artificially inseminated into a bargaining experiment, affected bargaining 
outcomes. Isaac and Smith (1985) found that subjects qua firms did not build 
entry-deterring reputations. 
Experiments on games have been enormously popular among psychologists 
and sociologists, especially in the 1960's and 1970's (Wrightsman, O'Connor, and 
Baker, 1972, cite more than a thousand papers). In these experiments, a simple 
noncooperative, non-zero-sum game (often the two-person prisoners' dilemma) is 
typically played repeatedly, with some variation in incentives, instructions, or 
social characteristics of the players. These experiments might be good tests for 
measuring attitudes and behavior in a social setting; but they are not especially 
good tests of theories of equilibrium play, because so much information is left 
uncontrolled. 
In prisoners' dilemmas with many repetitions, for instance, subjects typically 
cooperate initially, then defect toward the end of the game (e.g., Rapoport and 
Chammah, 1965), with some variation in results across studies (see Colman, 
1983). Initial cooperation may be equilibrium play in the game the subjects 
perceive, but we can't be sure in many of these experiments (though see Stoecker, 
1983) because the game they perceive includes lots of uncontrolled incomplete 
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information-who the other player is (often a confederate), the number of 
repetitions, whether payoffs are real, etc. (Colman, 1983, 117-118).2 
In contrast with these experiments, we limit players' incomplete information 
by making everything common knowledge, except for one kind of incomplete 
information we control-we randomly assign players to payoff structures which 
only they know (see also Hogatt, et al., 1978). By assuming that their knowledge 
of payoffs is the only incomplete information in the game, we can derive a SE 
path and test whether players follow it. 
Of course, we cannot completely limit all sources of information or beliefs of 
players. If players do not follow the SE path, they mav be playing the SE of a 
game based on some "homemade" incomplete information that we did not 
create. All we can do is measure their homemade beliefs from data, and make 
predictions about new experiments based on our measurement. If those predic- 
tions are accurate, we can conclude that subjects are playing some SE (though 
not the one we initially predicted), using their homemade incomplete information 
along with the controlled incomplete information. 
2. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 
Our experiments test SE in a game where one player with uncertain payoffs 
plays a finitely-repeated game against a series of different opponents with certain 
payoffs. (Thus, the reputation is "one-sided." "Two-sided" reputation models 
may be tested in further work.) 
A mnemonic story that makes the discussion easier to follow is that an 
entrepreneur (E) borrows from a different banker (B) each period for several 
periods (cf. Sobel, 1985, pp. 568-570). In each period, a B decides whether to 
lend to E, at a fixed interest rate. If E gets a loan he must decide whether to pay 
it back. An honest-type E (called a "Y-type" in our experiments) prefers to pay 
back loans. A dishonest-type E (an "X-type") prefers to renege (not pay back) on 
loans. E knows his own type, but B only knows the chances that E is of either 
type. (In our experiments, we used blander labels than these, to avoid creating 
nonmonetary preferences for strategies.3) 
The experiment game tree in Figure 1 shows the sequential structure of choices 
and payoffs, for one period of the game. (Payoffs are denonminated in "francs," 
an artificial currency equal to $.01 for B subjects, and $.0015 for E subjects.) 
Note how E's payoffs depended upon his or her type: If B chose to make a loan 
(L), a Y-type E got a higher payoff from paying back (P) than frorn reneging 
2 In this regard, note Ledyard's (1986) demonstration that in a reasonably general class of games, 
with appropriately transformed utility functions any equilibrium could be a Bayesian equilibrium. 
3E 's were called "B players," and bankers (B 's) were called "A players." Their choices were Al 
(no loan, or N) and A2 (loan, L); and given an A2, the "B's" could choose either B] (pay back, P) 
or B2 (renege, R). We chose bland labels-"B2," instead of "renege," or "sell crack"-because the 
SE might change dramatically if subjects think there is even a possibility that the connotation of 
words creates a nonmonetary preference for certain strategies. (Natural labels might produce 
detectable changes in the size of the "homemade" priors measured below.) The price of this control is 
that subjects may be bored by a nonsalient task, but this didn't seem to happen. In future work we 
intend to see whether natural labels might cue subjects to appropriate behavior early in the 
experiment, eliminating the error-ridden learning that we observed with bland labels. 
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FIGURE 1.-The experiment game tree. 
(R). An X-type E got a higher payoff from reneging than from paying back. 
(Thus, the monetary payments subjects earned in our experiment induced non- 
monetary preferences like those associated with honesty (Y-type) and dishonesty 
(X-type) in the natural world.) 
A single E subject played a sequence of 8 periods ("rounds," to them) against 
a series of different B subjects. E's type was chosen from a bingo cage before 
each sequence of eight periods. The type was announced to E (but not to the 
B's), and was fixed for an entire 8-period sequence. (After the sequence, the type 
was then announced to the B's.) Both sides knew the prior probability that an X- 
or Y-type would result (the prior was .33 in experiments 3-5, J0 in experiments 
6-8, and .00 in experiments 9-10). By reading the instructions aloud to all the 
subjects simultaneously, everything about the experiment's structure was made 
common knowledge (except for E's type). 
Subjects were MBA students at NYU or the University of Pennsylvania.4 Each 
subject participated in only one experiment. Subjects were paid the sum of the 
payoffs from all their decisions, in cash, at the end of the experiment. (Average 
payoffs were about $18 for the 2-1/2 hour experiment.) 
Each experiment had 75-100 repetitions of 8-period sequences, to give the 
subjects lots of experience. Thus, the subjects actually observed 600-800 periods 
of play. If a single E subject played throughout an entire experiment, he might 
consider the experiment a long supergame with several hundred periods. But the 
theory models each 8-period sequence as if it stands alone-players are expected 
to regard period 8 as the last play of the game, though in the experiment they 
4 NYU MBA's were used in experiments 3,5-6,9-10; and University of Pennsylvania MBA's were 
used in experiments 7-8. Experiment 4 contained a mixture of University of Pennsylvania MBA's 
and undergraduates. The data suggest no striking differences between these subject pools. 
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know more 8-period sequences lie ahead. We would like to have the players see 
enough repetitions of the entire 8-period game to be able to learn a sophisticated 
equilibrium concept, while regarding each 8-period game as separate. To avoid 
this problem, we used pools of E and B subjects. Three E subjects sat in a room 
together, with one experimenter, and the eight B subjects sat in another room 
with a second experimenter. Before each sequence, we used pre-determined 
random numbers to choose which of the three E subjects would play that 
sequence, and this number was not announced to the B subjects. Similarly, in 
each sequence a random pre-generated order of the same B subjects was used, 
and that order was not known by the E subjects. In theory, this randomness 
made it difficult for either side to develop any stable reputation other than that 
we deliberately seeded through the X- and Y-type payoffs (as we show in Section 
4.5.3 below). 
After the experimenters read the instructions (see Appendix B) aloud to both 
E and B subjects, the B subjects stayed together in one room, and the E subjects 
went to an adjoining room. The experimenters communicated with each other 
and with the subjects in each room by walkie-talkie, to restrict communication so 
that subjects could not identify their partners by voice.5 
3. COMPETING HYPOTHESES 
3.1. The Sequential Equilibrium Prediction 
We will sketch the derivation of SE for the parameters in experiments 3-5, 
starting with the last (8th) period first. 
SE play must be an equilibrium in every possible subgame. In subgames along 
the equilibrium path, players are assumed to use Bayes' rule to update their 
information about others based on observed play. In subgames off the equi- 
librium path, an SE must specify how players will update their beliefs (since 
Bayes' rule will usually not apply), and in these cases the SE is somewhat 
arbitrary. We solve for an SE by beginning in the last period, and calculate 
optimal play (including updating of beliefs) in the last period as a function of 
beliefs entering that period. Then we roll back to the second-to-last period, and 
calculate optimal play as a function of beliefs, taking into account the effect of 
second-to-last period actions on last-period beliefs, and hence on last-period 
play. We proceed this way back to the first period. 
In the last period, indexed T, the B player knows that an X-type E player will 
certainly renege. Therefore, if B thinks the probability that a player is Y-type is 
PT, B's expected value from choosing L is 40PT - 100(1 - PT) (for the parame- 
ters of experiments 3-5). (We assume risk-neutrality, additively separable utility, 
5 One advantage of using this method is that when E's were Y-types, they quickly learned that 
paying back was a dominant strategy. They chose to pay back very quickly to signal their type, since 
X-types had to think about whether to renege and Y-types did not, so a slow response from E could 
tip off B's that E was an X-type. (This even happened in the experiments with P(Y) =0, even 
though there were no Y-types.) To prevent speed from signaling E's type, the experimenters "held" 
quick responses for a second or two before communicating them. 
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and no time discounting in making these calculations; but we generalize for other 
risk tastes below.) The gain from lending exceeds the sure gain from not lending, 
10, if and only if PT is greater than the "threshold" of 110/140. Note that this 
PT is E's reputation, a measure of what type of player E is thought to be. 
In period T- 1, an X-type E could renege and get 150, and another 10 in 
period T (since B would not lend to E in period T). Or E can play a 
mixed-strategy, choosing to pay back with probability ST-, and reneging with 
probability 1 - ST-,. E will want to choose ST_1 so that when B observes E'S 
pay-back in period T - 1 and updates her beliefs about E, her updated posterior 
probability PT is above the threshold of 110/140. Then E's total expected 
earnings from periods T - 1 and T are 
(1) ST-(60 + 150) + (1 -ST- J)(150 + 10) = 150 + 10 + ST-(60- 10). 
Intuitively, since these expected earnings are increasing in ST-,, E wants to 
choose ST-, as large as possible, provided ST_1 makes the posterior probability 
PT above B's period T threshold of 110/140. (More precisely, if the probability 
PT is exactly at its threshold, B will be indifferent between lending and not 
lending. B will choose a mixed-strategy probability which makes E indifferent 
between reneging and paying back, and E will choose a mixed-strategy probabil- 
ity which makes the posterior probability PT equal to its threshold.) 
If B uses Bayes' rule to update probabilities, the posterior probability PT is 
given by 
(2) PT = PT-11['*PT-1 + ST-J( PT-1)]- 
For this posterior PT to exceed the lending threshold 110/140 (= .786) requires 
(3) ST- < PT-(I - .786)/(1 - PT-1)*.786. 
A rational E will choose ST_1 to make (3) hold as an equality. 
Now in period T - 1, B will lend if and only if 
(4) 40[PT-1 + ST-(1 -PT-1)] -100(1 ST-1)(1 -PT-1) > 10. 
Since E's will choose ST_1 to satisfy (3), we can plug ST1 from (3) into (4) and 
derive a threshold for PT-1' which is simply 
(5) PT-1 > (.786)2. 
In period T - k, E 's mixed-strategy probability should satisfy 
(6) ST-k = PT-k (1- .786 k)/(1-PT-k)(.786 k) 
and B's lending threshold in period T - k is 
(7) PT-k > .786 
(That is, since even X-type E 's are likely to pay back in early periods, B 's 
require less and less assurance that E is a Y-type to convince them to lend, so the 
threshold is lower.) 
If the game begins with some commonly-known prior probability h that E is a 
Y-type, the sequential equilibrium is for B to lend and for E to pay back, as long 
as the prior h is above the threshold in (7). But as k gets smaller (the end draws 
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near), the right-hand side of (7) grows, so h will eventually be less than .786k ?. 
At that point, the E player must then do something to enhance his 
reputation-that is, to increase B's posterior probability that E is a Y-type-or 
else B will refuse to lend in the remaining periods. In the period just before the 
inequality h > .786k" is violated, E begins playing mixed-strategies with prob- 
abilities of paying back given by (6). 
Once mixed-strategy play begins, E's choice of ST in equilibrium makes B 
indifferent between strategies, and vice versa. B chooses to lend with probability 
M, where M makes E indifferent between values of ST-1 in the expression 
(8) ST 1[60 + 150M+ 10(1 -M)] + (1 -ST-1)[150 + 10] 
= 150 + 10 + ST_1[60 - 150 + M(150 - 10)]. 
For the parameters in all our experiments, M = (150 - 60)/(150 - 10), or .643. 
This lending probability is optimal in every period where the posterior probabil- 
ity PT- k exactly equals B's threshold. 
Sequential equilibria are usually not unique because theorists have some 
freedom in choosing what beliefs agents will hold after out-of-equilibrium moves. 
(Bayes' rule doesn't apply to out-of-equilibrium events, which have zero probabil- 
ity.) In the SE we describe, the only out-of-equilibrium moves to which Bayes' 
rule doesn't apply are reneges in the early periods (periods 1-3 in experiments 
3-5, and periods 1-2 in experiments 6-8). Thus, to complete our SE we only 
need to specify what B's will think after they observe an early-period (out-of- 
equilibrium) renege. In deriving the SE above, we assumed that if B's observe an 
early-period renege they will believe E is an X-type, since reneging is a dominated 
strategy for Y-types.6 
The parameters in our experiments were chosen so that the equilibrium makes 
testable implications about three kinds of probabilities: reneging, "following," 
and lending. 
3.1.1. Reneging Probabilities 
The graph in Figure 2a illustrates the equilibrium path of P(Y), for an X-type 
E player, for the parameters in experiments 3-5. (Figure 2b is an analogous 
illustration for experiments 6-8, and these predictions are summarized in Table 
I.) In periods 1-3, the prior probability of 1/3 is above B's threshold; so B 
should always lend and an X-type E should always pay back. Period 4 is a 
crucial period, because X-type E's must begin playing mixed strategies to 
enhance their reputations, to make the probabilities PT-k meet larger and larger 
thresholds. For instance, in experiments 3-5 E should pay back with probability 
6 We have not explored whether this belief satisfies the many criteria proposed for refining 
sequential equilibria (e.g., Grossman and Perry, 1986; and see Cho and Kreps, 1987, for a criterion 
and a review). However, we shall consider the data for some guidance about what B's believe after an 
early-period renege. We can also rule out many implausible SE. like the one in which all E types 
renege in the early periods, B does not lend, and if B lends and E pays back, B thinks E is an 
X-type. B's latter belief is "inconsistent" in Grossman and Perry's (1986) sense (and probably can be 
ruled out by weaker criteria), since Y is one of the E types who prefers to pay back and B's belief 
should reflect that. 
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FIGURE 2b.-The equilibrium path of P(Y) (for an X-type E), experiments 6-8. 
.81 in period 4, to boost the prior of 1/3 up to the next period's threshold of 
.7864. (In Figure 2a, this is shown by a .81 probability on the branch leading to a 
higher P , and a .19 probability on the branch leading to P5 = 0.) Note that the 
mixed-strategy probabilities of payback get smaller and smaller, since the prior 
must be boosted more and more to reach each higher threshold. In the 8th and 
last period-if F makes it that far without ruining his reputation by reneging 
and sending P(Y) to 0-an X-type F will certainly renege; so in period 9 (i.e., 
after the sequence is over) P(Y) = 0. 
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TABLE I 
SUMMARY OF THEORETICAL PREDICTIONS 
Experiments 3-5 Experiments 6-8 
E's Reneging B's Lending "Following" E's Reneging B's Lending "Following" 
Probability Probabilities Probability Period Probability Probabilities Probability 
1.00 .643 1.00 8 1.00 .643 1.00 
.560 .643 1.00 7 .597 .643 1.00 
.415 .643 1.00 6 .473 .643 1.00 
.347 .643 1.00 5 .416 .643 1.00 
.192 1.00 .000 4 .380 .643 1.00 
.000 1.00 .000 3 .269 1.00 .000 
.000 1.00 .000 2 .000 1.00 .000 
.000 1.00 - 1 .000 1.00 - 
3.1.2. "Following" Probabilities 
SE makes a nonobvious prediction about what will happen following a period 
with no loan. In a period where there is no loan the prior PT-- k does not get 
revised at all (since E has no chance to either maintain or ruin his reputation). In 
periods 1-3, even if there is no loan the initial prior of 1/3 is still large enough, 
even unrevised, to exceed the threshold in the following period. Therefore, no 
loan in periods 1-3 should be followed by a loan in the next period. 
However, if there is no loan in period 4 the prior of 1/3 does not get revised, 
but it is below the period 5 threshold. The missed opportunity to build reputation 
in period 4 means that B's should be unwilling to lend in period 5. No loan in 
period 4 (or in any subsequent period) should be followed by a string of no loans. 
Thus, sequential equilibrium predicts a change in "following" probabilities 
(that is, the probability of no loan following no loan), from 0 to 1, in period 5 of 
experiments 3-5 and period 4 of experiments 6-8, as shown in Table I. 
3.1.3. B's Lending Probabilities 
SE has another nonobvious property: The payoffs for an X-type E do not affect 
E 's equilibrium play at all (assuming that the reneging payoff is less than the 
payoff from paying back). E's payoffs only affect the equilibrium through B's 
choice of lending probability in later periods. 
As shown above, B's optimal lending probability is .643 in all periods where 
the probability PT-k is at the lending threshold. (Mixing strategies in this way is 
rational in the usual weak sense: B does not benefit from playing a mixed-strategy, 
but no pure strategy is better.) 
Changes in E 's payoffs produce counter-intuitive changes in B 's lending 
probabilities. For instance, as E 's reneging payoff of 150 increases, one might 
think that indifferent B's would be less likely to lend. The opposite is true: As 
150 gets large compared to E's payoffs from paying back and from getting no 
loan, the fraction M approaches 1-if they are indifferent, B 's are almost sure to 
lend to make E's indifferent between reneging now and reneging later. In this 
10 COLIN CAMERER AND KEITH WEIGELT 
paper we do not test whether changing E's payoffs actually changes B's 
mixed-strategy play in the predicted way, but we can do so in further research. 
One caveat: All these predictions about players' behavior depend on the 
assumption that others are acting in accord with SE, and predictions in later 
periods depend upon the assumption that an SE has been played in earlier 
periods. Thus, we must judge the accuracy of predictions about later-period play 
conditional on observed early-period play. If play is not consistent with SE in 
early periods, for instance, then later-period play might be inconsistent with the 
overall SE described above, but consistent with the SE prediction beginning off 
the equilibrium path. 
3.2. Competing Hypotheses 
In experimental economics we try to test hypotheses against serious alternative 
hypotheses, rather than against toothless null hypotheses, to make " strong 
inferences" (Platt, 1964). There are no alternative hypotheses as precise as SE, 
but we shall try to specify a few plausible reasons why results may depart from 
SE. 
COMPETING THEORY # 1: Unraveling. If players ignore the possibility that E 's 
may be honest, then "unraveling" will result: B's will think that E will certainly 
renege in the 8th period, so E will then renege in the 7th period, and so forth. No 
loans will result. Persistent reputation-building (paying back by X-type E's) will 
falsify this theory. 
COMPETING THEORY #2: Social Norms. The cognitive or social force of 
traditions, or social norms, might freeze players into an equilibrium other than 
SE. (In economic terms, players may substitute the costs of thinking, or a taste 
for conformity to implicit group standards of behavior, for money gains.) As 
typically stated (e.g., Bettenhausen and Murnighan, 1985), this social norms 
prediction is hard to falsify, but we suppose that a social norm implies con- 
sistency of behavior. For instance, the norm "never renege until period 4" might 
develop among E players. This theory can be falsified if we shift parameters so 
that SE predicts reneging in period 3 (as in experiments 6-8), and we then 
observe reneging in period 3. Within an experiment, we can judge the strength of 
norms by whether each series of decisions varies markedly from sequence to 
sequence, and by whether individual players exhibit the same patterns of behav- 
ior. 
SE makes certain predictions which contradict squarely the notion that de- 
terministic norms govern behavior. For instance, SE predicts that no loans will be 
followed by no loans only in later periods, but not in early periods. A conformity 
theory which predicts that B's do what others do, always following no loans with 
no loans, can be falsified if the SE prediction proves correct. 
COMPETING THEORY #3: Risk Tastes. In our experiments we deliberately do 
not control or measure the risk-aversion of subjects (cf. Roth, 1983; Berg, et al., 
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1986; Harrison and McKee, 1985). However, it is easy to show7 that if B players 
are risk-averse (-seeking), the lending threshold is higher (lower). This means that 
under risk-aversion (-seeking), E's should begin to renege earlier (later), but they 
will renege less often (more often) than predicted by SE under risk-neutrality.8 If 
E 's are risk-averse, B's will lend less often (when they do play the mixed-strategy); 
but if E's are risk-seeking, B's lend more often. 
COMPETING THEORY #4: Altruism, or Envy. Call players "altruistic" (or 
"guilty") if they are happier when other players earn more (or, if they are 
unhappier when others earn less); and call them "envious" if they are happier 
when other players earn less. We can model such attitudes by assuming a B 
player earns a fraction gB of the E player's payoff (and similarly for E's). Then 
the lending threshold becomes (110-140gB)/(140-9OgB), and B's mixed-strategy 
probability becomes (90-140gE)/(140-llOgE). Thus, if B's are altruistic (gB > 0) 
the lending threshold is lower, so reneging begins later but E's renege more often 
(see footnote 7) than predicted by gB = O. If B's are envious (gB < 0), reneging 
begins earlier but E's renege less often. If E's are altruistic (gE > 0), B's lend 
less often than predicted; and if E's are envious (gE < 0), B's lend more often. 
COMPETING THEORY #5: Homemade Priors. The previous experimental work 
reviewed in the introductory section strongly suggests that subjects may have 
homemade priors about the information or tastes of others, along with the prior 
probabilities that we deliberately introduce into the experiment. For instance, 
even if we set the prior P(Y) equal to zero, players may act as if some fraction of 
the E's behave honestly, though we have not induced them to do so. (For 
instance, the homemade prior might be the percentage of E players who are so 
altruistic that they -will always pay back rather than renege.) If subjects do use a 
homemade prior that increases the effective P(Y), then reneging will begin later 
in the game than we predict; but once reneging has started, the amount of 
reneging will be the same as predicted. 
Some kinds of homemade priors should not affect the game. For instance, 
suppose the subjects think some B's will be so altruistic (or irrational) that they 
always choose to lend (even after a renege reveals that E is an X-type). Unless 
this percentage is quite high (e.g., for experiments 3-5, around 36 per cent), it 
7 For this simple game, risk attitudes can be easily summarized by defining the utility of the 
10-franc N payoff as x. If x = 10, players are risk-neutral; x < 10 means players are risk-seeking; and 
x > 10 means players are risk-averse. The critical threshold then becomes (100 + x)/140, so if players 
are risk-averse and x > 10, this threshold is larger. If players are risk-seeking, the threshold is smaller. 
For E players' risk-tastes, let the parameter 60 = x, and the ratio M that determines B 's mixed-strategy 
lending is then (150 - x)/(150 - 10). This ratio is lower if E's are risk-averse and higher if E's are 
risk-seeking. 
8 Suppose play is on the equilibrium path, and call the threshold t. Then in period T - k - 1, E 
chooses a mixed-strategy ST-k-1 to satisfy ST-k-1 = tT-k 1(1 tT- k)/tT-k(l - tT-k-1). Differ- 
entiation shows that this expression is increasing in t, so if the thresholds are higher (lower) by 
risk-aversion (-seeking), then E's will pay back more (less) than predicted under risk-neutrality. 
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will not affect E's play at all.9 The reason is that as long as E's payoffs in any 
period are increasing in the mixed-strategy probability of paying back, E will 
choose that probability to be as large as possible (though constrained by the 
requirement that the posterior probability of honesty is above B's lending 
threshold). Unless the chance of a B always lending is high, E's payoffs will be 
increasing in the mixed-strategy probability, and the game is unaffected. (Keep in 
mind that B's " type" does not matter much because in each period a different B 
plays, so B's cannot build up reputation effects of their own.) 
Note that competing theories #3-5 are only competing theories in a special- 
ized sense. In each case, we have asked what happens if some perturbation of 
subjects' payoffs that we cannot entirely control-risk-tastes, interdependence in 
utilities, or homemade priors about others' utilities-actually comes into play, 
and we have worked out the SE for each perturbation. These competing SE's are 
not competing solution concepts, they are simply attempts to anticipate possible 
deviations between predicted SE and actual behavior, based on uncontrolled 
payoffs. If SE with homemade priors, or SE with risk-aversion, turns out to 
describe behavior well, then we can still take the data as supportive of SE as a 
descriptive solution concept, provided that the subjects' homemade beliefs or risk 
tastes are empirically systematic. 
4. RESULTS 
We conducted three experiments (numbered 3-5) with a prior P(Y) of .33, and 
three experiments (6-8) with a prior of .10. All raw data from these experiments 
are shown in Appendix A, in Tables A.1-A.6 (except for the orders in which the 
B players actually played in each sequence, which are available from the 
authors). There is evidence of reputation-building in all experiments. The major- 
ity of E players did not renege at the first opportunity in the first sequence they 
played. 
The weakest requirement of SE in this game is that E's should not renege in 
early periods, and B's should not lend after observing a previous renege in that 
sequence. In the first 30 sequences or so, there were some violations of these 
minimal conditions, but the violations disappeared (with a few exceptions) as 
subjects gained experience. Since most authors discuss games with more than 8 
periods when explaining reputation-building,'0 it is significant that we observe 
reputation-building in games with only 8 periods. (We also saw reputation-build- 
ing in pilot experiments with 6 periods.) 
Table I summarizes the predictions of SE about reneging, lending, and follow- 
ing probabilities, in the two sets of experiments. We test these predictions with 
9 Take the period T- 1 play as illustrative. Suppose the chance of a perfectly altruistic B is K. 
Then E chooses ST_1 to maximize ST1(60 + 150) + (1 - STl)(150 + 150K+ 10(l - K)). This 
reduces to 160 + 140K + ST- 1(50 - 140K). The expression in parentheses is only negative, thereby 
changing E's optimal choice, if K> 50/140 (around .36). This threshold for K goes down as the 
game rolls back to the beginning, but for the parameters we have worked through it never gets so low 
that we expect E's to renege earlier than predicted by SE. 
10 E.g., Selten (1978, p. 153) hints that games with 2-4 periods will have no reputation-building, 
but 20-period games will. 
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cross-sectional data from each experiment, and with data pooled across experi- 
ments. 
For example, to estimate the reneging probability P( RT k I no previous R), we 
counted the fraction of times in each round T - k that X-type E subjects who 
had not reneged earlier in that sequence were given a loan and then reneged.11 
(We excluded periods in which E's had reneged earlier in the sequence because 
late-period lending in these sequences could be disequilibrium errors.) 
In each of the experiments we divided the sample of 8-period sequences into 
thirds, and analyzed each third separately. (In experiment 3, for instance, we 
analyzed sequences 1-30, 31-60, and 61-90 separately.) This simple way of 
dividing the data helps distinguish the period of learning and disequilibrium, 
which mostly occurs in the first third of the experiment, from equilibrium 
behavior exhibited in the last two thirds of the experiment. We often pooled data 
from the second and third thirds of the sequences in each experiment, since these 
thirds were generally quite similar. (Indeed, that similarity is our assurance that 
we are observing equilibrium behavior.) 
We shall discuss in turn each of the three kinds of probabilistic predictions: 
Reneging, lending, and following. 
4.1. Reneging Probabilities 
Sequential equilibrium predicts that the mixed-strategy probability of an 
X-type E reneging, P( R TI no previous R) rises monotonically, but erratically, 
across rounds (recall Table I, or Figures 2a-b for the predictions). 
Because data from replications of the same experiment were very similar, we 
pooled data to get more statistical power in estimating the reneging probabilities. 
Tables II and III show reneging probability estimates from experiments 3-5 
pooled (prior P(Y) = .33) and experiments 6-8 pooled (P(Y) = .10). Figures 3 
and 4 show the predicted reneging probabilities and the reneging estimates from 
the last two-thirds of the sequences, pooled across experiments (with 90 per cent 
confidence intervals around the estimated means). 
If we take the mixed-strategy probability predicted by SE to be a null 
hypothesis about a binomial proportion, we can test that hypothesis with the 
standard normal approximation to the binomial distribution.12 These test statis- 
11 Note that the number of informative observations could be quite low in later periods, since it 
was not often that a dishonest E made it to a late period without having reneged, and then got a loan. 
This is the primary reason why we ran many repetitions of a short game, rather than a longer game 
with few repetitions. 
12 That is, we calculate standard errors as (p (1 - p)/n )1/2, where p is the probability predicted by 
SE and n is the sample size for a particular round. Then the test statistic, p minus the estimated p 
divided by the standard error, is normally distributed around zero with variance of one if the null 
hypothesis is true. If the hypothesized proportion is zero or one, we can estimate the standard error 
using the observed proportion. We also checked that observations were independent, because tests of 
binomial proportions rely on the assumption of independence. The choices in a given round were 
remarkably independent across sequences-for instance, choices in the 6th round when a loan was 
made to an X-type E were approximately uncorrelated from sequence to sequence, perhaps because a 
different B subject was randomly chosen to play in the 6th round in each sequence. 
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TABLE II 
PREDICTED VS. ACTUAL RENEGING BY E PLAYERS, EXPERIMENTS 3-5 
P(R in t Ino previous R); P(Y) = .33 
Last Two 
Thirds 
First Third Second Third Last Third Pooled Pre- 
Period Actual Actual Actual Actual dicted z-score 
8 .909 (10/11) .909 (10/11) .818 (9/11) .864 (19/22) 1.000 - 
7 .600 (15/25) .625 (5/8) .445 (4/9) .529 (9/17) .560 .26 
6 .167 (6/36) .320 (8/25) .240 (6/25) .280 (14/50) .415 1.93 
5 .053 (2/38) .156 (7/45) .119 (5/42) .138 (12/87) .347 4.10 
4 .075 (3/40) .082 (5/61) .018 (1/56) .051 (6/117) .192 3.92 
3 .089 (4/45) .000 (0/59) .033 (2/61) .017 (2/120) .000 - 
2 .087 (4/46) .048 (3/62) .016 (1/62) .032 (4/124) .000 - 
1 .222 (10/45) .081 (5/62) .015 (1/65) .047 (6/127) .000 - 
TABLE III 
PREDICTED VS. ACTUAL RENEGING BY E PLAYERS, EXPERIMENTS 6-8 
P(R in t I no previous R); P(Y) =.10 
Last Two 
Thirds 
First Third Second Third Last Third Pooled Pre- 
Period Actual Actual Actual Actual dicted z-score 
8 .920 (11/12) 1.00 (7/7) 1.00 (6/6) 1.00 (13/13) 1.000 - 
7 .500 (11/22) .467 (7/15) .556 (10/18) .515 (17/33) .597 .96 
6 .184 (7/38) .429 (15/35) .120 (3/25) .300 (18/60) .473 2.70 
5 .146 (7/48) .157 (8/51) .150 (6/40) .154 (14/91) .416 5.07 
4 .020 (2/49) .067 (4/60) .088 (5/57) .077 (9/117) .380 6.75 
3 .111 (6/54) .077 (5/65) .000 (0/65) .031 (4/130) .269 5.94 
2 .036 (2/55) .047 (3/64) .046 (3/65) .047 (6/129) .000 - 
1 .093 (5/54) .016 (1/65) .046 (3/66) .031 (4/131) .000 - 
0.8 Predicted 
0.6 90% CI. jmean Actual 
P(Rt no previous) R 
0.4- 
0.:- 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
period 
FIGURE 3.-Predicted vs. actual probabilities of reneging by E players (with 90 per cent 
confidence intervals), experiments 3-5 pooled. 
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FIGURE 4.-Predicted vs. actual probabilities of reneging by E players (with 90 per cent 
confidence intervals), experiments 6-8 pooled. 
tics are reported in the right-hand column ("z-scores") in Tables II and II, and 
shown graphically in Figures 3 and 4 by the 90 percent confidence intervals (with 
confidence interval standard errors calculated from the estimated proportions, 
rather than from predicted proportions). 
The actual proportions of reneging were generally lower than the SE predic- 
tions (so the z-scores are almost always positive), significantly so in early rounds 
3-5. (The SE predictions in rounds 6 and 7 are more accurate, but the small 
samples in those later rounds don't give us much power to distinguish between a 
true null hypothesis and altemative hypotheses close to SE.) 
The hypothesis tests suggest that the deviations between SE and the data are 
much too large to be due to chance, except in round 7 from both sets of 
experiments. However, the estimated proportions of reneging do rise almost 
monotonically: Note from Figures 3 and 4 that the upper bound of each round's 
confidence interval generally is below (or almost below) the lower bound of the 
next round's confidence interval. 
4.2. Lending Probabilities 
The estimates of B's lending probabilities, P(LTI no NT,1 no previous R) are 
shown in Tables IV-V, for data pooled across experiments 3-5 and experiments 
6-8. Generally, the probabilities are very close to one (B's always lend) in early 
rounds, and less than one in later rounds. In experiments 3-5 (Table IV) we see a 
drop in the actual proportion of lending, from .913 to .721, between periods 4 
and 5 where SE predicts a drop from 1.00 to .643.13 (Note that this drop is absent 
in the first third of the sequences-the change between rounds 4 and 5 is from 
.894 to .897-suggesting that it takes subjects a little while to learn to begin using 
mixed strategies in round 5.) Testing the hypothesis that p = .643 for each of 
13A large-sample normally-approximated z-test for the difference in proportions between rounds 4 
and 5 yields z = 5.26, 1.16, and 1.80 for experiments 3-5 separately and z = 6.00 for the last two 
thirds of the sequences pooled across experiments. 
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TABLE IV 
PREDICTED VS. ACTUAL LENDING BY B PLAYERS, EXPERIMENTS 3-5 
P(L in tINo N in t - 1, no previous R); P(Y) = .33 
Last 
First Second Last Two 
Third Third Third Thirds 
Period Actual Actual Actual Actual Predicted z-score 
(1-4) .819 (244/298) .930 (304/327) .959 (328/342) .945 (632/669) 1.00 - 
(5-8) .834 (151/181) .626 (87/139) .608 (101/166) .616 (188/305) .643 1.00 
8 .870 (20/23) 1.00 (5/5) .538 (7/13) .667 (12/18) .643 -.21 
7 .667 (30/45) .318 (7/22) .419 (13/31) .377 (20/53) .643 4.03 
6 .891 (49/55) .548 (23/42) .615 (32/52) .585 (55/94) .643 1.18 
5 .897 (52/58) .743 (52/70) .700 (49/70) .721 (101/140) .643 -1.95 
4 .894 (59/66) .937 (74/79) .890 (73/82) .913 (147/161) 1.00 - 
3 .900 (63/70) .949 (75/79) .965 (82/85) .957 (157/164) 1.00 - 
2 .829 (63/76) .951 (78/82) .977 (85/87) .964 (163/169) 1.00 - 
1 .686 (59/86) .885 (77/87) 1.00 (88/88) .943 (165/175) 1.00 - 
TABLE V 
PREDICTED VS. ACTUAL LENDING BY B PLAYERS, EXPERIMENTS 6-8 
P(L in t I No N in t - 1, no previous R); P(Y) = .10 
Last 
First Second Last Two 
Third Third Third Thirds 
Period Actual Actual Actual Actual Predicted z-score 
(1-3) .889 (177/199) .986 (210/213) .980 (201/205) .983 (411/418) 1.00 - 
(4-8) .862 (175/203) .825 (175/212) .784 (149/190) .806 (324/402) .643 -6.79 
8 .625 (10/16) .500 (5/10) .429 (3/7) .471 (8/17) .643 1.48 
7 .735 (25/34) .500 (13/26) .682 (15/22) .583 (28/48) .643 .87 
6 .848 (39/46) .745 (38/51) .683 (28/41) .717 (66/92) .643 - 1.48 
5 .961 (50/52) .917 (55/60) .778 (42/54) .850 (97/114) .643 -4.60 
4 .928 (51/55) .985 (64/65) .924 (61/66) .954 (125/131) .643 - 7.40 
3 .952 (60/63) 1.00 (69/69) 1.00 (65/65) 1.00 (134/134) 1.00 - 
2 .923 (60/65) 1.00 (72/72) .985 (67/68) .993 (139/140) 1.00 - 
1 .803 (57/71) .958 (69/72) .958 (69/72) .958 (138/144) 1.00 - 
rounds 5-8 separately, we see z-scores (Table IV) barely consistent with the SE 
prediction (and far off in round 7). Testing for the data from rounds 5-8 
combined (in the second line of the table), we see very close convergence, with an 
estimated proportion of .616 (and with a sample large enough to convince us that 
the accuracy of the .643 prediction is probably not due to chance). 
The data from experiments 6-8 in Table V are less supportive of SE. We do 
not see the sharp drop from rounds 3 to 4 as predicted (though the drop in last 
two-thirds data, pooled, is statistically significant'4), but there is a monotonic 
drop in B's propensity to lend in every round from rounds 4 through 8. (And 
note that z-scores for the hypothesis p = .643 tested on each round's data 
14 That is, a large-sample z-test for the difference between the proportions 1.00 and .954 yields 
z =2.56. 
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TABLE VI 
PREDICTED VS. ACTUAL FOLLOWING BY B PLAYERS, EXPERIMENTS 3-5 
P(N in tlN in t- 1, noprevious R); P(Y) =.33 
Experiment 3 Experiment 4 Experiment 5 Expenrments 3-5 
(Seqs. 31-90) (Seqs. 31-90) (Seqs. 27-82) Pooled 
Period Actual Actual Actual Actual Predicted 
(2-4) .333 (1/3) .100 (1/10) .200 (2/10) .174 (4/23) .000 
(5-8) .692 (36/52) .833 (40/48) .694 (25/36) .743 (101/136) 1.00 
8 .500 (5/10) 1.00 (11/11) .813 (13/16) .784 (29/37) 1.00 
7 1.00 (16/16) .929 (13/14) .692 (9/13) .884 (38/43) 1.00 
6 .681 (15/22) .769 (10/13) .600 (3/5) .700 (28/40) 1.00 
5 .000 (0/4) .600 (6/10) .000 (0/2) .375 (6/16) 1.00 
4 (0/0) .125 (1/8) .000 (0/1) .111 (1/9) .000 
3 .000 (0/1) (0/0) .000 (0/5) .000 (0/6) .000 
2 .500 (1/2) .000 (0/2) .500 (2/4) .375 (3/8) .000 
TABLE VII 
PREDICTED VS. ACTUAL FOLLOWING BY B PLAYERS, EXPERIMENTS 6-8 
P(N in tIN in t- 1, no previous R); P(Y) = .10 
Experiment 6 Experiment 7 Experiment 8 Experiments 6-8 
(Seqs. 24-70) (Seqs. 26-77) (Seqs. 24-69) Pooled 
Period Actual Actual Actual Actual Predicted 
(2-3) (0/0) .000 (0/7) (0/0) .000 (0/7) .000 
(4-8) .737 (14/19) .934 (57/61) .878 (43/49) .884 (114/129) 1.00 
8 .867 (13/15) 1.00 (18/18) .900 (18/20) .925 (49/53) 1.00 
7 (0/0) 1.00 (19/19) .842 (16/19) .921 (35/38) 1.00 
6 (0/0) .867 (13/15) .889 (8/9) .875 (21/24) 1.00 
5 (0/0) .750 (6/8) 1.00 (1/1) .778 (7/9) 1.00 
4 (0/0) 1.00 (1/1) (0/0) 1.00 (1/1) 1.00 
3 (0/0) .000 (0/1) (0/0) .000 (0/1) .000 
2 (0/0) .000 (0/6) (0/0) .000 (0/6) .000 
separately are not far from zero in rounds 6-8, but are very far off in rounds 4-5, 
and for the pooled data.) 
4.3. B's Following Probabilities 
SE predicts the probability of no loan following a no loan in the previous 
period will change from 0 to 1 between rounds 4 and 5 in experiments 3-5, and 
between rounds 3 and 4 in experiments 6-8. (In general, the last round with zero 
following probability is the round in which E begins playing mixed-strategies.) 
Tables VI-VII show the data from experiments 3-5 and 6-8 (with data from 
the last two thirds of each experiment pooled because samples were very small). 
We do see changes in the following probability as predicted, but the samples are 
too small to permit powerful tests. Pooling rounds with the same predicted 
following probability (2-4 and 5-8 in Table VI; 2-3 and 4-8 in Table VII) and 
testing for differences in proportions yields z = 5.42 for experiments 3-5. The 
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small samples in experiments 6-8 make the z-test inappropriate, but the observed 
probabilities-0/7 and 114/129-are consistent with the following-probability 
predictions of SE. 
4.4. Competing Theories 
The data are generally consistent with the qualitative predictions of SE about 
the proportions of reneging, lending, and following. The data cannot distinguish 
subtle differences between perfect or sequential equilibria15 and theories of 
heuristic or boundedly rational play which approximate perfect equilibrium, but 
they can rule out many simple theories. We think the data are best taken as an 
antidote to the argument hat SE couldn't possibly describe behavior because it is 
too complicated. Since the precise numerical predictions of SE are often rejected, 
especially in the consistent under-reneging of E players, we now consider 
whether competing theories can explain the systematic deviations between SE 
and actual behavior. 
Clearly, competing theory #1 (unraveling) is falsified. (Below, we report 
experiments with P(Y) = 0 in which unraveling is the theoretical prediction of 
perfect and sequential equilibrium, but it is falsified there also.) 
Competing theory #2 (social norms) is harder to falsify. If social norm 
theories imply consistency between players, they are falsified by the systematic 
variations in players' strategies (see Tables XIII-XIV for data from experiment 
7). Players do not seem to obey group norms and act similarly. If social norm 
theories imply consistency across sequences, they are contradicted by the chronic 
variation across sequences, which is easily seen from the raw data in Appendix A. 
Any norm theory which suggests different subjects will all do the same thing in a 
particular period cannot stand up to the data. Theories like "lend until period 8," 
"never renege until period 6," etc., are clearly false. 
Theories which predict the same norms will arise in different experiments, 
perhaps because of focal points in the game structure, are ruled out by the 
responsiveness of the data to parameter shifts. For instance, the theory that 
people in experiments 3-5 obey the norm "don't renege until halfway through 
the game (period 4)" is falsified by reneging in period 3 of experiments 6-8 
(where SE predicts reneging). Any norm theories which are invariant to the 
proportion of (Y) players are similarly falsified by comparing experiments 3-5 
and 6-8. The theory that B players conform whenever other players choose no 
loan before them is falsified by the change in following probabilities between 
periods 4-5 (experiments 3-5) and periods 3-4 (experiments 6-8)-in early 
periods, B's do not conform. 
In fairness, we note that these experiments are not very conducive to the 
development of norms because players cannot communicate, deviance cannot be 
15A more demanding test would involve changing E's payoffs, or any other parameters which 
should produce large changes according to competing theories and small changes according to SE. We 
shall do this in future work, and also gather probability judgments from players during the game, to 
test whether strategies and beliefs are in equilibrium as SE predicts. 
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punished, and the experiments do not last very long. However, norms or 
conformity pressures might explain some of the disequilibrium behavior in early 
sequences of an experiment, like the tendency for B players to lend even after the 
E player reneged on a loan earlier in the same sequence. 
The basic predictions of SE seem correct- E's renege increasingly toward the 
end, B's lend sporadically in late periods-but the observed proportions of 
reneging and lending do not match the proportions predicted by SE. Since 
competing theories # 3-5-risk-tastes, altruism or envy, and homemade 
priors-predict some SE, but with probabilities different than those we have 
specified, these competing theories might help explain the deviations from SE. 
The homemade pnor theory (#5) predicts that reneging (and mixed-strategy 
lending) will begin later than we predict, but once reneging begins, the propor- 
tions of reneging and lending should be as predicted. By contrast, the risk-tastes 
( #4) and altruism or envy (# 5) theories predict that reneging will start later, and 
E's will over-renege (for altruism or risk-seeking); or reneging will start earlier, 
and E's will under-renege (for envy or risk-aversion). The homemade prior 
theory has no effect on B's probability of lending, but the other theories predict 
more lending (risk-seeking or envy) or less lending (risk-aversion or altruism). 
The stylized facts seem to be that E's start to renege later, and then 
under-renege, while B's lend about the correct amount of the time (perhaps 
over-lending in experiments 6-8). None of the competing theories explains these 
stylized facts entirely well, but after observing experiments 3-8 we realized that 
the homemade prior theory could explain many of the facts.16 This theory has the 
distinct advantage of predicting the same amount of B lending as SE predicts. 
Since the lending predictions seemed accurate, we fit the homemade prior theory 
to the experiment 3-8 data, and ran more experiments (described below) to see 
how well the fitted theory could predict. We note also that the homemade prior 
theory is supported by the earlier empirical work which finds reputation forma- 
tion where no incomplete information has been explicitly introduced, as in 
frequent cooperation in the repeated prisoners' dilemma. 
4.5. The Homemade Prior Theory, Revisited and Jeopardized 
We focus on a particular homemade prior theory: subjects think some propor- 
tion of the X-type E's will always pay back (like Y-types). We first estimated this 
proportion from the data on experiments 3-5 and 6-8, then we ran further 
experiments to test whether the theory that subjects play an SE with the same 
honesty proportion we measured in experiments 6-8. 
The total prior P(Y) will consist of the prior we created (either .33 or .10), 
along with some fraction q of the proportion 1 - P(Y) of X-type E's, who 
behave like Y-types despite our efforts to induce X-type preferences. We can try 
to estimate this total prior (then calculate q from the estimated total) by seeing in 
which period E's begin reneging with any frequency. 
16 We thank the referees and David Kreps for pointing us in this direction. 
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4.5.1. Estimating the Homemade Prior in Experiments 3-8 
According to SE, E's should begin reneging in the period just before the 
threshold exceeds the prior. For instance, in experiments 3-5, there is little 
reneging (i.e., less than 5 per cent, with no apparent upward trend) until period 5, 
when X-type E's reneged 13.8 per cent of the time (Table II). The thresholds in 
periods 5 and 6 are .381 and .485, respectively. Thus, we estimate the total prior 
to be between .381 and .485, but we can be even more precise. If the X-type E's 
are playing optimally, then their reneging probability in period S is chosen to 
make the posterior P(Y) in period 6 equal to the threshold of .485. (However, 
note that the observed fraction of reneging, .138, is an average of zero reneging 
by the q proportion of X-types who behave like Y's, and a proportion of 
reneging .138/(1 - q) by the 1 - q proportion of X-types.) Thus, using Bayes' 
rule and assuming optimality, we can infer that the total prior P(Y) satisfies 
(10) .485= 1 .*P(y) 
1*P(Y) + I - 1 (I - P(Y)) 
Since P(Y) = 1/3 + 2q/3 by assumption, solving (10) for q yields q = .161. 
The calculation for experiments 6-8 works the same way. Since E's reneged 
only 7.7 per cent of the time in period 4 (Table III), and 15.4 per cent of the time 
in period 5, we take period 5 to be the first reneging period. The threshold in 
period 6 is .296, so the analogous condition to (10) for the total prior P(Y) is 
(11) .296= 1*P(y) 
1*P(Y) + I1 - I }(I - P(Y)) 
Substituting P(Y)= .1 + .9q and solving for q yields q = .172. This is quite close 
to the estimate of q = .161 from experiments 3-5, which used different subjects 
and different parameters. 
4.5.2. Testing the Homemade Prior Theory 
Since the homemade prior appears to have some empirical regularity, we ran 
two experiments with an initial prior P(Y) = 0, to test the theory that subjects 
act as if P(Y) is around .17. (Zero-prior experiments can also falsify the 
unraveling theory, and create some continuity between our work and the large 
number of earlier experiments with no controlled incomplete information.) 
Experiments 9-10 were run exactly like experiments 3-8, except that we used 
no bingo cage to randomly determine whether E was an X-type or a Y-type, and 
we changed one parameter as a test of robustness (B's reneging payoff was - 75, 
not - 50 or - 100 as in earlier experiments). The raw data are shown in 
Appendix A, Tables A.7-A.8, and summary statistics are provided in Tables 
VIII-XII. Using a (completely homemade) prior P(Y) of .17, we predict that 
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TABLE VIII 
PREDICTED VS. ACTUAL RENEGING BY E PLAYERS, EXPERIMENT 9 
P(R in tIno previous R); P(Y)=0 
Last Two 
Thirds 
First Third Second Third Last Third Pooled Pre- 
Period Actual Actual Actual Actual dicted 
8 (0/0) .667 (2/3) .750 (3/4) .714 (5/7) 1.000 
7 1.00 (1/1) .400 (2/5) .588 (10/17) .545 (12/22) .575 
6 (0/0) .333 (2/6) .100 (2/20) .154 (4/26) .436 
5 .667 (2/3) .000 (0/4) .048 (1/21) .040 (1/25) .374 
4 .600 (3/5) .111 (1/9) .091 (2/22) .097 (3/31) .332 
3 .600 (6/10) .375 (3/8) .103 (3/29) .162 (6/37) .274 
2 .400 (8/20) .286 (4/14) .000 (0/29) .093 (4/43) .000 
1 .148 (8/54) .153 (9/56) .034 (2/59) .093 (11/118) .000 
TABLE IX 
PREDICTED VS. ACTUAL RENEGING BY E PLAYERS, EXPERIMENT 10 
P(R in t I no previous R); P(Y) = 0 
Last Two 
Thirds 
First Third Second Third Last Third Pooled Pre- 
Period Actual Actual Actual Actual dicted 
8 .667 (2/3) (0/0) (0/0) (0/0) 1.000 
7 .667 (2/3) .333 (1/3) (0/0) .333 (1/3) .575 
6 .364 (4/11) 1.00 (2/2) (0/0) 1.00 (2/2) .436 
5 .143 (2/14) .300 (3/10) .667 (2/3) .385 (5/13) .374 
4 .043 (1/23) .444 (8/18) .250 (1/4) .409 (9/22) .332 
3 .032 (1/31) .156 (5/32) .353 (6/17) .224 (11/49) .274 
2 .000 (0/29) .030 (1/33) .226 (7/31) .125 (8/64) .000 
1 .000 (0/29) .000 (0/33) .030 (1/33) .015 (1/66) .000 
TABLE X 
PREDICTED VS. ACTUAL RENEGING BY E PLAYERS, EXPERIMENTS 9-10 
P(R in t no previous R); P(Y) = 0 
Last Two 
Thirds 
First Third Second Third Last Third Pooled Pre- 
Period Actual Actual Actual Actual dicted z-score 
8 .667 (2/3) .667 (2/3) .750 (3/4) .714 (5/7) 1.000 - 
7 .750 (3/4) .375 (3/8) .588 (10/17) .520 (13/25) .575 .56 
6 .363 (4/11) .500 (4/8) .100 (2/20) .214 (6/28) .436 2.36 
5 .235 (4/17) .214 (3/14) .125 (3/24) .158 (6/38) .374 2.75 
4 .143 (4/28) .333 (9/27) .115 (3/26) .226 (12/53) .332 1.63 
3 .171 (7/41) .200 (8/40) .196 (9/46) .198 (17/86) .274 1.58 
2 .163 (8/49) .106 (5/47) .117 (7/60) .112 (12/107) .000 - 
1 .148 (8/54) .153 (9/56) .034 (2/59) .093 (11/118) .000 - 
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TABLE XI 
PREDICTED VS. ACTUAL LENDING BY B PLAYERS, EXPERIMENTS 9-10 
P(L in tINo N in t - 1, no previous R); P(Y) = 0 
Last 
First Second Last Two 
Third Third Third Thirds 
Period Actual Actual Actual Actual Predicted z-score 
(1-3) .873 (144/165) .880 (146/166) .912 (165/181) .896 (311/347) 1.00 - 
(4-8) .506 (40/79) .571 (40/70) .736 (78/106) .670 (118/176) .643 -.47 
8 1.00 (1/1) .200 (1/5) .429 (3/7) .333 (4/12) .643 1.48 
7 .143 (1/7) .500 (2/4) .833 (15/18) .773 (17/22) .643 -.80 
6 .231 (3/13) .455 (5/11) .857 (18/21) .719 (23/32) .643 -.56 
5 .458 (11/24) .500 (9/18) .739 (17/23) .634 (26/41) .643 .08 
4 .706 (24/34) .719 (23/32) .677 (25/37) .696 (48/69) .643 -.58 
3 .873 (41/47) .816 (40/49) .836 (46/55) .827 (86/104) 1.00 - 
2 .891 (49/55) .870 (47/54) .968 (60/62) .922 (107/116) 1.00 - 
1 .857 (54/63) .937 (59/63) .922 (59/64) .929 (118/127) 1.00 - 
TABLE XII 
PREDICTED VS. ACTUAL FOLLOWING BY B PLAYERS, EXPERIMENTS 9-10 
P(N in tIN in t - 1, no previous R); P(Y) = 0 
Experiment 9 Experiment 10 Experiments 9-10 
(Seqs. 31-90) (Seqs. 34-100) Pooled 
Period Actual Actual Actual Predicted 
(2-3) .333 (5/15) .667 (2/3) .389 (7/18) .000 
(4-8) .600 (30/50) .890 (105/118) .803 (135/168) 1.00 
8 .700 (7/10) 1.00 (28/28) .921 (35/38) 1.00 
7 .500 (5/10) .903 (28/31) .805 (33/41) 1.00 
6 .667 (8/12) .960 (24/25) .865 (32/37) 1.00 
5 .556 (5/9) .680 (17/25) .647 (22/34) 1.00 
4 .556 (5/9) .889 (8/9) .722 (13/18) 1.00 
3 .571 (4/7) .500 (1/2) .556 (5/9) .000 
2 .125 (1/8) 1.00 (1/1) .222 (2/9) .000 
reneging should start in period 3. Reneging predictions for all periods are given 
in Tables VIII-X. 
The two experiments were very different. In experiment 9, subjects were very 
slow to learn. There were many sequences, until very late in the experiment, in 
which E reneged in an early period, then B made a loan and E reneged again (in 
one cases, five times in a single sequence). In the final third of the sequences, 
behavior came slightly close to SE with the homemade prior, except that E's did 
not renege nearly as much as predicted until periods 7 and 8 (see Table VIII). 
Lending probabilities did not drop much from periods 3 to 4 (as SE predicts; see 
Table XI), and following probabilities were not especially accurate either (Table 
XII). 
Experiment 10 was entirely the opposite: Subjects learned to build reputation 
almost immediately, and the frequencies of reneging (Table IX), were close to 
predicted in almost every period. Lending, when pooled with experiment 9, did 
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drop between period 3 and period 4 (Table XI), and aggregate late-period lending 
was .670, close to the prediction of .643. Following jumped somewhat from 
period 3 to period 4, but the samples are small (Table XII). 
Experiment 9 could probably be excluded from the analysis, because two B 
subjects said (in written comments) they thought the E choices were made 
randomly or by the experimenters, but we shall pool it with experiment 10, and 
analyze the pooled results.17 The pooled results from the last two-thirds of 
sequences (Table X) indicate an increase in reneging from periods 2 to 3, but E's 
under-reneged in period 3 (.198 actual, .274 predicted). E's also under-reneged in 
periods 4-6 (a result of strong under-reneging in experiment 9). 
If we use period 3 reneging to calculate the value of q implicit in behavior (as 
we did for experiments 3-5, q = .161, and 6-8, q = .172), we estimate q = .184 
and q = .171 for experiments 9 and 10 separately, and q = .176 for the experi- 
ments pooled. Since there were parameter changes (and different subjects) in all 
three sets of experiments, the degree of concordance of these estimates of the 
homemade prior q is a pleasant surprise. 
Furthermore, the subjects' homemade prior is roughly consistent with the 
behavior they observed. For instance, in experiment 9 E 's reneged only 5 times 
out of 7 in period 8 (excluding sequences containing earlier reneges), so a subject 
who thought 17 per cent of the E's were honest would have that expectation 
roughly fulfilled by the data- E's did behave honestly, 29 per cent of the time. 
In experiments 3-5 there were 19 of 22 reneges in period 8, which is easily 
consistent with q = .161; but there were 13 of 13 reneges in period 8 of 
experiments 6-8 (which should occur only 8.6 per cent of the time if q = .172 is 
right). 
When we look back at experiments 3-5 and 6-8 with the belief that subjects 
used a homemade prior of 17 per cent, along with the controlled prior, some of 
the deviations between SE and observed behavior can be explained. With a 
homemade prior of 17 per cent reneging should only start in period 5 for both 
sets of experiments, so the only reneging probabilities that we expect to be 
correct are those in periods 6-8. In these periods, the predictions are generally 
quite accurate (although period 6 reneging is a little low, and the samples are 
small). This reanalysis, along with the accuracy of the prediction that B's lend 
with probability .643, leads us to conclude that SE, with a homemade prior of 17 
per cent, describes subjects' aggregate behavior reasonably well. 
4.5.3. Overarching Reputation-Building Is Suboptimal 
One potential problem with our design is that the E player in one sequence has 
a 1/3 chance of playing the next sequence, and the B players know this. This 
gives E players some incentive to develop a reputation which arches over 
17 Plott (1986) gives a rationale for rejecting such data, and some examples. Experiments are joint 
tests of whether controls worked ("internal validity"), and whether theories are true. If controls did 
not work-in our case, some experiment 9 subjects thought they were playing against experimenters, 
or random devices-then we can legitimately exclude the data. 
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different sequences, but we now show that this incentive is too small to make 
reputation-building across sequences optimal, so it cannot explain the homemade 
prior we observe. 
Denote the equilibrium expected value to E of a game which begins with prior 
h by V(h, X) if E plays like an X, and V(h, Y) if E plays like a Y. The crucial 
question is whether it pays for an X-type E to pay back in the 8th period of the 
current game and continue to play honestly (if he gets a chance) in sequences 
which follow immediately afterward, rather than renege and play like an X-type. 
We consider only the sequences which follow immediately afterward because we 
assume the other E's, if they are X's, are playing like X-types."8 In experiments 
6-8, by reneging E earns 150 and his expected earnings from immediately 
following sequences, V(.1, X)/3 + V(.1, X)/9 + V(.1, X)/27 + ... Assuming the 
sequence of terms continues infinitely (a good approximation), reneging thus 
yields 150 + V(.1, X)/2. Since V(.1, X) = 276.2, reneging in the 8th period thus 
yields 288.1. By behaving honestly in the 8th period, an X-type E earns 60 and 
has a 1/3 chance of playing the next sequence, with a prior of (1/3)(1) + (2/3)(.1), 
or .4. (This assumes that after paying back in the 8th period, the B's take E to be 
a perfectly honest type in all future sequences, except they know there is only a 
1/3 chance that E will play the next sequence.) An X-type who behaves honestly 
earns 60 + V(.4, Y)/2, or 244.2. (The analogous figures for experiments 3-5 are 
334.4 for reneging, and 290.0 for honesty. These calculations omit the homemade 
prior. Adding it makes the advantage of reneging over honesty even larger.) 
Thus, with 3 E players it is not optimal to pay back in the 8th period, because 
there is not enough probability of playing the subsequent sequence(s), and even if 
the same E plays, the B's do not know that. (It is also not optimal with 2 E 
players, as in experiment 4, but the difference in payoffs is smaller.) 
These calculations assume that an E player who pays back in the 8th period 
does so alone. We do not know how to model the development of collusive group 
reputations, and they rarely occurred (perhaps because we restricted verbal 
communication between players). In future experiments, we shall dilute the 
incentive to form overarching reputations even further, by not allowing E's to 
play two sequences in a row. Then, only group reputations could form. 
4.6. Individual Behavior and Self-Insight 
The formal statistical analyses, and the reanalysis (and new experiments) to 
detect any homemade prior, suggest that SE predicts well; but there is much 
behavior that is not easily captured by summary statistics. 
The behavior of subjects in our experiments provides some support for the 
usual defense of complicated theories in economics-people act "as if" they 
18 This is another approximation, since another Y-type E might play between two sequences where 
the same honest-behaving E plays, thus maintaining the B's beliefs that the honest-behaving E is 
playing. However, this will happen rarely, especially in experiments 6-8, so our approximation is 
close. 
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TABLE XIII 
PROPORTION OF RENEGING BY INDIVIDUAL E PLAYERS 
Sequences 26-77, Experiment 7 
Player Player Player 
Period El E2 E3 
8 4/4 1/1 1/1 
7 1/4 1/1 2/2 
6 0/4 1/1 1/3 
5 1/8 2/6 0/4 
4 0/14 4/14 3/8 
3 0/16 2/17 1/12 
2 0/16 1/17 3/15 
1 0/13 0/17 1/13 
maximize, though they make no calculations. Our subjects knew no formal game 
theory, made almost no calculations, and were often puzzled or skeptical when 
we described the sequential equilibrium to them after the experiment. Yet their 
aggregate behavior is not badly described by SE. How? 
The "testimony" of subjects, the answers they gave to simple questions asked 
after the experiment, provides some clues. Most subjects described decision rules 
that were consistent with sequential equilibrium, but not nearly so elaborate. Said 
E3: "I was trying to disguise the fact that I was an X type, and waiting before I 
made a [renege] decision." Many other subjects talked about reputation in 
roundabout terms-as in "not killing the golden goose," or, "developing trust." 
(See Table XIII for actual reneging probabilities in experiment 7 for each E 
player.) 
Their self-reported decision rules were usually less sophisticated than their 
apparent behavior. Said B2: "The deciding factor, somehow seemed to be the 
round number... The farther along the rounds, the more likely I would choose 
[no loan]." The word "somehow" is telling: Like many other subjects, B2 seemed 
to use a near-optimal strategy without knowing why it was near-optimal. 
One reason aggregate play could be close to SE, even if each individual subject 
was not exactly following SE, is that the choice of E player and the sequence of 
B players were randomly varied from sequence to sequence. Even if all players 
used pure strategies (like Bi: "If my round number was 6 or greater, I definitely 
picked [no loan]"), the random choice among such players using different pure 
strategies could look exactly like mixed-strategy play. (This argument is used to 
explain how animal populations can achieve intricate mixed-strategy equilibria, 
even though individual animals presumably play pure strategies. See, e.g., 
Dawkins, 1976, or Maynard-Smith, 1982.) Indeed, about half the players seemed 
to use simple cutoff strategies-pay back until period 4, lend until period 6, and 
so on-but their cutoffs varied (see the data on individual lending strategies in 
experiment 7, Table XIV). For instance, B subjects 4, 5, and 7 always made loans 
in periods 5-8; Bi and B8 never did. But since the choice of which B subjects 
played in periods 5-8 varied, the result was that periods 5-8 loans were made 59 
per cent of the time (cf. the SE prediction of .643). 
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TABLE XIV 
PROPORTION OF LENDING BY INDIVIDUAL B PLAYERS 
Sequences 26-77, Experiment 7 
Player Player Player Player Player Player Player Player 
Period BI B2 B3 B4 B5 B6 B7 B8 
8 0/0 1/1 0/0 0/0 1/1 0/0 1/1 0/0 
7 0/0 0/0 1/2 1/1 0/0 0/0 1/1 0/1 
6 0/4 1/1 1/3 1/1 1/1 0/3 2/2 0/1 
5 0/2 2/4 2/3 4/4 4/4 3/4 3/3 0/6 
4 6/6 9/9 3/4 7/7 5/5 5/5 1/4 1/3 
3 4/4 4/4 5/5 11/11 4/4 6/6 5/5 7/7 
2 6/6 3/3 9/9 3/3 7/7 7/7 6/7 8/8 
1 8/8 9/9 6/7 3/6 5/7 4/4 5/6 5/5 
When subjects did use mixed strategies, they rationalized them as the selection 
of pure strategies based on an internal thought process (which is unpredictable to 
an opponent). Said Bi: "If my round number was 5, it was a toss up-I would 
operate on a hunch." B6: "If [renege] was picked once, and then [no loan], I 
went with my 'gut feeling'." By basing their randomization on privately-known 
hunches, subjects are "purifying" their mixed strategies, or thinking of them as 
equivalent to choices of pure strategies based on random realizations of private 
information (e.g., Harsanyi, 1973; Aumann, et al., 1983). 
5. CONCLUSION, METHODOLOGICAL LESSONS, AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
We conclude that SE predicts reasonably well, given its complexity. However, 
formal statistical tests reject SE strongly for some periods of the game. Subjects 
failed to renege as early in the game, or as often, as predicted. 
Because other predictions of SE about lending and following were fairly 
accurate, we sought a competing theory that could explain the observed under- 
reneging without otherwise changing the predicted SE. One plausible competing 
theory is that subjects bring into the experiment a "homemade" prior belief that 
some subjects will not renege, even when we tried to induce a preference for 
reneging. This homemade prior theory is consistent with the large body of 
evidence that subjects in repeated games cooperate more often than predicted, 
including recent economics experiments showing reputation formation. 
We estimated the homemade prior, q, from experiments 3-5 (q = .161) and 
experiments 6-8 (q = .172). We then ran two experiments (9-10) in which we did 
not induce preferences that would lead any subjects to not renege, and we made 
predictions assuming 17 per cent of the subjects would not renege. In these 
experiments the homemade prior is about .176. Thus, some of the descriptive 
failures of SE are diminished when we include the homemade incomplete 
information about preferences which subjects create themselves. The existence of 
this homemade prior is a failure of our experimental control, but we were able to 
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estimate that homemade prior reliably from different experiments (using different 
subjects, and parameter changes). 
The data suggest that people are reasonably good intuitive game players, 
though other evidence suggests people are poor intuitive statisticians, and are 
poor intuitive scientists-e.g., Kahneman, Slovic, and Tversky (1982). Perhaps 
everyday life does not prepare people for the surprises of Bayes' rule, or to search 
for disconfirming data, but life does provide a lot of practice interacting with 
other people of unknown character. Still, SE requires Bayesian updating along 
with optimal strategy choice. It is interesting that subjects are apparently able to 
use Bayes' rule to approximate a sophisticated SE, while erring in simpler 
applications of Bayes' rule (e.g., Camerer, 1987). 
We draw one methodological esson from our work. It takes time for subjects 
to learn in this experiment. In the first 30 sequences or so, which took about an 
hour, subjects invariably made mistakes. An experiment like ours which lasted 
only one hour (30 sequences) would yield very different conclusions about the 
descriptive accuracy of SE. Also, subjects need to observe several actual plays of 
the end of the game, before they can play optimally in early periods. (This 
tendency to learn the last period first is called the "swingback hypothesis" in 
research on asset markets, e.g., Forsythe, Palfrey, and Plott, 1982). Experiments 
in which subjects play a long repeated game only once (as in most earlier game 
experiments) may misleadingly suggest that subjects play sub-optimally. 
There are several avenues for further research. First, we suspect that giving 
su'bjects a history of previous play (e.g., on a computer screen) will aid in 
convergence to SE. Second, we can test SE predictions about the effects of 
parameter changes which are especially counter-intuitive, like varying E's payoffs 
and testing whether the reneging proportions vary (they shouldn't, unless E's 
payoffs affect the homemade prior). Third, experimental data may provide a way 
to specify the off-equilibrium path behavior of subjects. The importance of 
updating beliefs (out of equilibrium) is the chief characteristic of SE, but 
out-of-equilibrium beliefs are often arbitrary or difficult to refine. By asking 
subjects their beliefs about E's type or strategy each period, we can directly 
measure how beliefs are updated after off-path moves.'9 These data could 
complement the theoretical work on refinements of SE which seek to rule out 
irrational out-of-equilibrium beliefs (e.g., Cho and Kreps, 1987; Grossman and 
Perry, 1986). Fourth, the fact that SE predicts behavior reasonably well in this 
simple setting suggests that subjects could behave coherently in much more 
elaborate settings-with two-sided reputation, "third-party" reputation between 
consumers and producers (such as product reviewers; see Yao and Faulhaber, 
1985), and networks or grapevines of personal reputation. Finally, the long 
period of disequilibrium behavior early in these experiments raises the important 
19 Of course, we don't expect to see many out-of-equilibrium moves by experienced subjects. 
However, we carn gather data from each of several subjects after each such move, and we can possibly 
provoke off-path moves by changing parameters frequently. 
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question of how people learn to play complicated games. The data could be fit to 
statistical learning models (e.g., Selten and Stoecker, 1986), though new experi- 
ments or new models might be needed to explain learning adequately. Indeed, 
even equilibrium behavior could conceivably be better explained by a heuristic 
model in which people adapt or learn to approximate SE, than by SE itself. 
Department of Decision Sciences, The Wharton School, University of Pennsyl- 
vania, Philadelphia, PA 19104, U.S.A. 
and 
Department of Management, Graduate School of Business Administration, New 
York University, 100 Trinity Place, New York, NY 10006, U.S.A. 
Manuscript received November, 1985; final revision received December, 1986. 
APPENDIX A: RAW DATA 
TABLE Al 
CHOICES OF SUBJECTS 
Experiment 3 [Pr of Y= .331] 
1 -2,1, 2,33,3,3,3,33,3 26 -3,1, 1,1,1,1,1,1,2,3 51 -1,2, 1,1,1,1,3,3,3,3 76 -2,1, 1,1,1,1,3,1,1,3 
2 -1,1, 2,3,3,2,3,3,3,3 27 -2,1, 1,1,1,1,3,1,3,3 52 -3,1, 1,1,1,1,2,3,3,3 77 -2,1, 1,1,1,1,1,1,3,3 
3 -2,1, 2,3,33,33,2,3,3 28 -3,1, 1,1,1,1,1,3,2,3 53 -3,1, 1,1,1,1,1,3,3,3 78 -3,1, 1,1,1,1,3,2,3,3 
4 -3,1, 3,3,2,3,3,3,3,3 29 -2,1, 1,1,1,1,1,3,3,2 54 -1,1, 2,3,3,3,3,3,33,3 79 -3,1, 1,1,1,1,3,3,3,3 
5 -2,1, 2,3,3,3,3,3,3,3 30 -3,1, 1,1,1,1,1,1,3,3 55 -3,1, 1,1,1,1,3,3,3,3 80 -2,1, 1,1,1,1,2,3,3,3 
6 -3,2, 3,3,1,1,1,1,1,1 31 -1,1, 2,3,3,33,3,3,3 56 -3,1, 1,1,1,1,3,3,3,3 81 -3,1, 1,1,1,1,3,3,3,3 
7 -3,1, 3,3,2,2,33,33,3 32 -1,1, 3,2,3,3,3,3,3,3 57 -3,1, 1,1,1,1,3,3,3,3 82 -1,2, 1,1,1,1,1,1,3,1 
8 -1,2, 3,3,3,1,1,1,1,1 33 -2,2, 1,1,1,1,1,1,3,3 58 -2,1, 1,1,1,2,3,3,3,3 83 -2,1, 1,1,1,1,3,1,3,2 
9 -2,2, 1,1,11,1,1,1,1 34 -3,1, 1,1,1,1,1,3,3,3 59 -1,2, 1,1,1,1,1,1,3,1 84 -3,1, 1,1,1,1,1,3,3,3 
10 -3,1, 3,3, 2,3,3,33,3 35 -2,1, 1,1,1,1,1,3,3,3 60 -2,1, 1,1,1,1,3,3,3,3 85 -2,1, 1,1,1,1,1,2,3,3 
11 -1,1, 2,3,3,3,3,3,3,3 36 -2,1, 1,1,1,1,2,3,3,3 61 -2,1, 1,1,1,1,3,3,3,3 86 -3,1, 1,1,1,1,1,3,3,3 
12 -3,1, 2,3,3,3,3,3,3,3 37 -3,1, 1,1,1,1,3,1,3,3 62 -1,2, 1,1,1,1,1,3,3,3 87 -1,2, 1,1,1,11,1,1,3 
13 -2,1, 1,1,1,1,1,1,1,3 38 -1,2, 11,1,1,3,1,1,1 63 -3,2, 1,1,1,1,3,1,3,3 88 -3,1, 1,1,1,3,3.3,3,3 
14 -3,1, 3,3,3,3,1,1,2,3 39 -3,1, 1,1,1,1,1,3,3,3 64 -2,1, 1,1,1,1,2,3,3,3 89 -2,1, 1,1,1,1,1,3,3,2 
15 -1,2, 1,1,1,1,1,1,3,1 40 -2,1, 3,3,1,1,1,3,3,2 65 -3,1, 1,1,1,1,3,3,3,3 90 -3,1, 1,1,1,1,3,3,2,3 
16 -2,1, 1,1,1,1,1,1,2,3 41 -2,1, 1,1,1,1,1,3,3,3 66 -2,2, 1,1,3,1,3,1,1,3 
17 -1,2, 1,1,1,1,1,3,1,3 42 -3,2, 1,1,1,1,1,3,3,3 67 -3,1, 1,1,1,1,1,1,3,3 
18 -2,1, 3,1,1,1,1,1,3,3 43 -1,2, 1,1,1,1,3,3,3,3 68 -3,1, 1,1,1,1,1,2,3,3 LEGEND 
19 -3,1, 1,1,1,1,1,1,3,3 44 -3,1, 1,1,1,1,1,3,3,3 69 -1,2, 1,1,1,1,1,3,3,1 
20 -3,1, 1,2,33,3,3,3,3 45 -2,1, 1,1,1,3,1,1,3,2 70 -3,1, 1,1,1,1,3,3,3,3 lst number= round 
21 -2,1, 3,1,1,1,1,2,3,3 46 -2,1, 1,1,1,1,2,3,3,3 71 1,2, 1,1,1,1,3,3,3,3 2nd number= E's number 
22 -1,2, 1,1,1,1,3,3,1,1 47 -2,1, 1,1,1,1,3,3,3,3 72 -3,2, 1,1,1,1,3,1,1,1 3rdnumber=E'stype(1=X) 
23 -1,2, 1,1,1,1,1,1,3,3 48 -3,2, 1,1,1,1,1,3,3,3 73 -2,1, 1,1,1,1,1,3,3,2 4-11 numbers= round choices: 
24 -1,1, 2,3,3,3,3,3,3,3 49 -2,1, 3,1,1,1,3,2,3,3 74 -3,1, 1,1,1,11,1,3,2 1=loan,payback, 
25 -3,1, 3,1,1,1,1,1,1,2 50 -1,2, 1,1,1,1,1,3,3,3 75 -1,2, 1,1,1,3,11,1,1 2=loan,renege; 3=noloan. 
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TABLE A2 
CHOICES OF SUBJECTS 
Experiment 4 [Pr of Y= .33] 
1 -3,1, 2,3,3,3,3,3,2,2 26 -2,1, 1,1,1,1,1,1,3,2 51 -3,2, 1,1,1,1,3,3,3,3 76 -2,2, 1,1,1,3,1,1,3,3 
2 -2,2, 3,1,1,1,1,1,1,1 27 -2,1, 1,1,1,3,1,1,3,3 52 -2,1, 1,1,1,1,3,3,2,3 77 -3,1, 1,1,2,3,3,3,3,3 
3 -3,1, 3,3,3,3,3,3,2,3 28 -3,1, 1,1,1,1,1,3,2,3 53 -3,1, 1,1,1,1,1,1,3,3 78 -2,1, 1,1,1,1,1,3,3,3 
4 -2,1, 3,1,1,1,2,2,3,3 29 -2,2, 1,1,1,1,1,1,3,3 54 -3,1, 1,1,1,2,3,3,3,3 79 -3,1, 1,1,1,1,1,1,3,3 
5 -2,1, 1,1,3,1,3,2,3,2 30 -3,1, 1,1,1,1,3,1,2,3 55 -3,1, 1,1,1,1,1,2,3,3 80 -3,2, 1,1,1,1,1,3,1,1 
6 -3,1, 1,2,2,3,3,3,2,3 31 -2,1, 1,1,1,1,1,3,3,3 56 -2,1, 1,1,1,1,1,3,3,3 81 -3,1, 2,3,3,3,3,3,3,3 
7 -3,1, 1,2,3,3,3,3,3,3 32 -2,1, 1,1,3,1,1,2,3,3 57 -2,1, 1,1,1,1,2,3,3,3 82 -2,1, 1,1,1,1,1,3,3,3 
8 -3,1, 1,1,2,2,3,3,3,3 33 -2,1, 1,1,1,1,1,3,3,3 58 -2,2, 1,1,1,3,3,1,1,3 83 -3,2, 1,1,1,3,3,3,3,3 
9 -2,1, 3,1,1,3,1,1,2,3 34 -3,1, 1,2,3,1,3,3,3,3 59 -2,1, 1,1,1,1,2,3,3,3 84 -3,2, 1,1,1,1,3,1,3,3 
10 -3,2, 3,1,1,3,1,1,1,1 35 -2,1, 3,1,1,1,1,2,3,3 60 -3,2, 1,1,1,1,3,3,3,3 85 -2,1, 1,1,3,1,1,3,3,3 
11 -2,1, 1,1,1,1,1,1,1,2 36 -3,1, 2,3,1,3,3,2,3,3 61 -3,1, 1,1,1,1,2,3,3,3 86 -2,2, 1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1 
12 -3,2, 1,1,1,3,1,1,1,1 37 -3,2, 1,1,1,1,1,3,3,3 62 -2,1, 1,1,1,3,3,3,3,3 87 -3,1, 1,1,1,1,3,3,3,3 
13 -3,1, 1,1,1,1,1,2,2,2 38 -3,1, 3,1,3,2,3,3,3,2 63 -2,1, 1,1,2,3,3,3,3,3 88 -3,1, 1,1,3,3,1,1,1,1 
14 -2,1, 1,3,1,1,1,1,1,3 39 -2,1, 1,1,1,1,1,3,3,2 64 -3,2, 1,1,1,1,3,3,3,3 89 -3,1, 1,1,1,1,3,3,3,2 
15 -2,1, 1,1,1,1,1,1,2,3 40 -3,2, 1,1,1,3,3,1,3,3 65 -3,2, 1,1,1,3,3,3,1,1 90 -2,2, 1,1,1,1,1,3,3,3 
16 -3,2, 1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1 41 -2,1, 1,1,1,1,3,3,3,3 66 -2,1, 1,1,1,3,1,3,3,3 
17 -2,1, 1,1,1,1,1,1,1,2 42 -2,1, 1,1,1,2,3,3,3,3 67 -2,1, 1,1,1,1,1,1,3,3 
18 -3,1, 1,3,1,1,1,2,3,2 43 -3,1, 1,2,1,3,3,3,3,2 68 -3,2, 1,1,1,3,1,3,3,1 
19 -3,1, 1,1,1,1,1,2,3,2 44 -3,2, 1,1,1,3,3,3,3,3 69 -2,1, 1,1,1,1,1,1,1,3 
20 -2,1, 1,1,1,1,1,1,1,2 45 -2,2, 1,1,1,1,3,1,3,3 70 -2,1, 1,1,1,3,1,1,3,3 
21 -2,1, 1,1,1,1,1,1,2,3 46 -3,1, 1,1,3,2,3,3,3,3 71 3,1, 1,1,1,1,3,3,2,3 
22 -3,1, 1,1,1,1,1,2,2,3 47 -2,1, 2,3,2,3,3,3,3,3 72 -2,1, 1,1,1,1,1,1,3,3 
23 -2,1, 1,1,1,1,1,3,1,2 48 -2,1, 1,1,1,1,1,3,3,2 73 -3,1, 1,1,1,1,3,1,2,3 
24 -3,1, 3,1,1,2,3,3,3,3 49 -3,1, 2,3,3,3,3,3,3,3 74 -2,1, 1,1,1,1,1,3,3,2 
25 -3,2, 1,1,1,1,1,1,3,1 50 -2,1, 1,1,1,3,3,3,3,3 75 -3,1, 1,1,1,1,3,3,3,3 
TABLE A3 
CHOICES OF SUBJECTS 
Experiment 5 [Pr of Y = .33] 
1 -1,2, 1,3,1,2,1,3,1,3 26 -3,1, 3,1,1,1,1,1,1,1 51 -2,1, 1,1,1,1,1,2,3,3 76 -3,2, 1,1,1,3,1,1,1,3 
2 -3,1, 1,1,1,3,2,1,3,2 27 -1,1, 1,1,1,1,1,1,1,2 52 -3,2, 1,1,1,1,1,3,3,3 77 -1,1, 1,1,1,1,1,1,3,2 
3 -1,2, 1,2,1,1,3,1,1,1 28 -2,1, 3,1,1,1,1,1,3,2 53 -2,1, 1,1,1,1,3,1,3,3 78 -was skipped 
4 -1,2, 3,3,3,1,3,2,3,2 29 -1,1, 1,1,1,1,1,3,3,2 54 -1,1, 1,1,1,1,1,3,2,3 79 -1,1, 1,1,1,1,1,1,3,3 
5 -3,1, 1,1,1,1,1,1,1,2 30 -2,1, 1,1,1,1,1,1,3,3 55 -2,1, 1,1,1,1,1,3,3,3 80 -2,1, 1,1,1,1,1,3,3,3 
6 -2,2, 2,3,3,3,1,1,1,1 31 -1,1, 3,3,1,1,2,3,3,3 56 -3,1, 1,1,1,1,1,1,3,3 81 -3,2, 1,1,1,1,1,1,1,3 
7 -1,1, 3,2,2,3,3,2,3,3 32 -2,1, 1,1,1,1,1,2,3,2 57 -1,1, 1,1,1,1,3,3,3,3 82 -2,1, 1,1,1,1,1,2,3,3 
8 -3,1, 1,1,1,1,1,1,3,3 33 -3,1, 1,1,1,1,1,1,2,3 58 -3,2, 1,1,1,1,1,1,3,3 
9 -1,1, 3,1,3,2,3,3,2,3 34 -3,1, 1,1,1,1,1,3,1,1 59 -2,1, 1,1,1,1,1,3,3,2 LEGEND 
10 -3,2, 3,1,1,1,1,3,1,1 35 -1,1, 1,1,3,1,2,3,3,3 60 -3,1, 1,1,1,1,1,3,3,3 
11 -1,1, 3,1,1,2,2,3,3,3 36 -2,1, 1,1,1,1,1,2,3,3 61 -1,1, 1,3,1,2,3,3,3,3 lstnumber=round 
12 -2,2, 1,1,3,1,1,1,1,1 37 -2,1, 1,1,1,1,1,1,2,3 62 -1,1, 1,2,3,3,1,3,3,3 2nd number= E's number 
13 -1,1, 3,1,1,1,1,1,2,2 38 -3,2, 1,1,1,1,1,3,3,3 63 -2,1, 1,1,1,1,2,2,3,3 3rdnumber=E'stype(1=X) 
14 -1,2, 3,3,1,1,1,1,3,3 39 -1,1, 3,3,1,1,3,3,3,3 64 -2,1, 1,1,1,1,2,3,3,3 4-11 numbers= round choices: 
15 -3,1, 1,1,1,1,1,1,2,1 40 -2,1, 1,1,1,1,1,1,3,3 65 -3,2, 1,1,1,1,1,1,3,3 1=loan,payback; 
16 -1,1, 3,2,3,3,1,1,1,1 41 -3,1, 1,3,1,1,1,1,3,2 66 -1,1, 1,1,1,1,3,3,3,2 2=loan,renege; 3=noloan. 
17 -2,1, 3,3,1,1,1,1,3,3 42 -3,2, 1,1,1,1,1,1,3,3 67 -1,1, 1,1,1,1,1,1,1,3 
18 -2,2, 1,1,1,1,1,1,3,3 43 -2,1, 1,1,1,1,1,1,3,2 68 -3,1, 1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1 
19 -1,2, 3,1,1,1,1,1,1,1 44 -1,1, 1,1,1,1,1,1,1,2 69 -1 1, 1,3,1,1,1,1,3,3 
20 -2,1, 1,1,1,3,1,1,2,3 45 -2,1, 1,1,1,1,1,1,3,3 70 -2,1, 1,1,1,1,1,2,2,3 
21 -2,1, 1,1,1,1,1,1,3,3 46 -3,1, 1,1,1,1,1,2,3,3 71 3,2, 1,1,1,1,1,3,1,3 
22 -3,1, 1,3,1,1,1,1,2,3 47 -3,1, 1,1,1,1,1,1,3,3 72 -1,1, 1,1,1,1,1,1,3,3 
23 -3,1, 3,3,1,1,1,1,3,3 48 -2,1, 3,1,1,1,3,1,3,3 73 -1,1, 1,1,1,1,1,3,3,3 
24 -2,2, 1,1,1,1,1,1,3,3 49 -2,1, 1,1,1,1,1,3,2,3 74 -2,1, 1,1,1,3,1,2,3,3 
25 -1,1, 1,1,1,1,3,1,1,2 50 -1,1, 1,1,1,1,1,1,2,3 75 -1,1, 1,1,1,1,1,3,3,3 
30 COLIN CAMERER AND KEITH WEIGELT 
TABLE A4 
CHOICES OF SUBJECTS 
Experiment 6 [Pr of Y = .10] 
1 -2,1, 2,3,3,3,3,3,3,3 26 -3,1, 1,1,1,1,1,2,3,3 51 -2,1, 1,1,1,1,1,1,1,3 
2 -3,1, 1,3,1,1,2,3,2,3 27 -2,2, 1,1,1,1,1,1,3,3 52 -3,1, 1,1,1,1,1,1,3,3 
3 -3,1, 1,1,3,1,]1,2,3,3 28 -1,1, 1,1,1,1,1,1,3,3 53 -1,1, 1,1,1,1,1,1,1,3 
4 -1,1, 1,1,1,1,1,1,1,2 29 -3,1, 1,1,1,1,1,2,3,3 54 -2,1, 1,1,1,1,1,1,2,3 
5 -1,1, 1,1,1,1,1,1,1,2 30 -1,1, 1,1,1,1,1,1,1,2 55 -3,1, 1,1,1,1,1,2,3,3 
6 -2,2, 3,1,1,3,1,1,1,1 31 -3,1, 1,1,1,1,1,1,1,3 56 -2,1, 1,1,1,1,1,2,3,2 
7 -3,1, 3,1,1,1,1,1,2,2 32 -2,1, 1,1,1,1,1,1,3,3 57 -1,1, 1,1,1,1,1,1,1,3 
8 -1,1, 1,1,1,1,1,1,1,2 33 -3,1, 1,1,1,1,1,1,2,3 58 -3,1, 1,1,1,1,1,1,2,3 
9 -1,1, 1,1,1,1,1,1,1,3 34 -1,1, 1,1,1,1,1,3,2,1 59 -2,1, 1,1,1,1,1,1,3.3 
10 -2,1, 1,1,1,1,1,1,1,3 35 -1,1, 1,1,1,1,1,1,3,3 60 -2,1, 1,1,1,1,1,3,2,3 
11 -2,1, 3,1,1,1,1,1,2,3 36 -2,1, 1,1,1,1,1,2,3,3 61 -1,1, 1,1,1,1,1,1,1,3 
12 -3,1, 1,1,1,1,1,1,3,3 37 -3,1, 1,1,1,1,1,2,3,3 62 -3,1, 1,1,1,1,1,1,2,3 
13 -3,1, 1,1,1,1,1,2,2,2 38 -2,1, 1,1,1,1,2,2,3,3 63 -3,1, 1,1,1,1,1,1,2,3 
14 -2,1, 1,1,1,1,2,2,3,3 39 -2,1, 1,1,1,1,1,1,2,3 64 -1,1, 1,1,1,1,1,1,3,3 
15 -1,1, 1,1,1,1,1,j,3,3 40 -3,1, 1,1,1,1,1,2,3,3 65 -2,2, 1,1,1,1,1,1,3,1 
16 -2,1, 1,1,1,1,1,2,2,3 41 -1,2, 1,1,1,1,1,1,1,3 66 -2,1, 1,1,1,1,1,1,3,3 
17 -2,1, 1,1,1,1,1,1,2,3 42 -1,1, 1,1,1,1,1,1,3,3 67 -3,1, 1,1,1,1,1,1,2,3 
18 -3,1, 1,1,1,1,1,3,3,2 43 -2,2, 1,1,1,1,1,1,1,3 68 -3,1, 1,1,1,1,1,1,2,3 
19 -1,1, 1,1,1,1,1,1,1,3 44 -3,1, 1,1,1,1,1,1,1,3 69 -1,1, 1,1,1,1,1,1,2,2 
20 -2,1, 1,1,1,3,1,1,3,3 45 -1,1, 1,1,1,,1,1,3,3 70 -2,1, 1,1,1,1,1,1,3,2 
21 -3,1, 1,1,1,1,1,1,3,3 46 -2,1, 1,1,1,1,2,3,3,3 
22 -2,1, 1,1,1,1,1,2,3,2 47 -3,1, 1,1,1,1,1,2,3,3 
23 -1,1, 1,1,1,1,1,3,1,3 48 -1,1, 1,1,1,1,1,1,1,2 
24 -1,1, 1,1,1,1,1,1,1,3 49 -3,1, 1,1,1,1,1,1,2,3 
25 -3,1, 1,1,1,1,1,2,3,3 50 -2,1, 1,1,1,1,1,1,2,3 
TABLE A5 
CHOICES OF SUBJECTS 
Experiment 7 [Pr of Y = .10] 
1 -2,2, 3,1,1,1,1,1,1,1 26 -2,2, 1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1 51 -3,1, 1,1,1,3,1,3,3,2 76 -1,1, 1,1,1,1,1,1,1,2 
2 -2,1, 3,3,3,3,3,1,1,2 27 -1,1, 3,1,1,1,1,1,3,3 52 -3,1, 1,72,27,,3,3,3,2 77 -3,1, 1,1,1,1,1,3,3,3 
3 -3,1, 3,3,2,2,3,3,3,3 28 -3,1, 3,1,1,1,1,3,2,2 53 -1,1, 1,1,1,1,1,3,3,3 
4 -1,1, 1,1,1,1,1,1,2,1 29 -1,1, 3,1,1,1,1,1,1,2 54 -3,1, 2,1,1,1,3,3,3,3 
5 -3,1, 3,2,1,2,3,3,3,3 30 -2,1, 1,1,1,1,1,2,3,3 55 -2,1, 1,3,1,2.3,3,3,3 
6 -2,1, 3,3,3,1,2,3,2,3 31 -1,1, 1,1,1,1,1,3,3,3 56 -1,1, 1,1,1,1,3,3,3,2 
7 -1,1, 3,1,1,1,1,1,2,2 32 -2,1, 1,1,1,1,2,2,3,3 57 -1,1, 1,1,1,3,3,3,2,3 
8 -1,1, 1,1,1,1,1,1,1,3 33 -1,1, 1,1,1,1,1,3,3,3 58 -2,1, 1,1,1,1,1,3,3,2 
9 -1,1, 1,1,1,1,1,1,3,2 34 -3,1, 1,1,1,2,3,3,3,2 59 -2,1, 1,1,1,2,3,3,3,3 LEGEND 
10 -3,1, 1,1,2,3,2,3,3,2 35 -1,1, 3,1,1,1,3,3,3,3 60 -3,1, 3,2,3,3,3,3,2,3 
11 -2,1, 2,3,3,3,3,3,3,3 36 -2,1, 1,1,1,2,3,2,3,2 61 -3,2, 2,3,3,3,3,3,3,3 lstnumber=round 
12 -3,1, 3,1,2,3,3,3,2,3 37 -3,1, 1,1,1,2,3,3,3.3 62 -1,1, 1,1,1,1,3,3,3,3 2ndnumber= E'snumber 
13 -3,1, 1,2,3,3,3,2,3,3 38 -3,1, 1,1,1,1,1,1,2,3 63 -2,1, 1,1,1,3,3,3,3,3 3rdnumber=E'stype(1=X) 
14 -3,2, 1,3,1,2,3,1,3,1 39 -2,1, 1,1,1,1,2,3,3,3 64 -2,1, 3,1,1,1,1,3,3,3 4-11 numbers=roundchoices: 
15 -1,2, 3,1,1,1,1,1,1,1 40 -3,1, 1,1,1,1,3,2,3,3 65 -1,1, 1,1,1,1,1,3,3,3 1=loan,payback; 
16 -2,1, 3,1,1,1,1,1,2,3 41 -2,1, 1,1,1,1,3,3,2,3 66 -1,1, 1,1,1,3,3,3,3,3 2=loan,renege; 3=noloan. 
17 -2,1, 3,1,3,1,1,3,2,3 42 -2,1, 1,1,1,1,1,3,3,3 67 -3,1, 3,1,1,3,3,3,3,2 
18 -1,1, 1,1,1,1,3,1,1,2 43 -3,1, 1,1,1,1,3,1,3,3 68 -1,1, 1,1,1,1,2,3,3,3 
19 -2,1, 3,1,1,1,2,3,3,2 44 -1,1, 1,1,1,1,3,3,3,3 69 -2,1, 1,1,1,1,3,3,3,3 
20 -1,1, 3,1,1,1,1,1,3,2 45 -3,1, 1,1,1,2,3,3,3,2 70 2,1, 1,1,1,1,3,3,3,3 
21 -1,1, 3,1,1,1,1,1,2,2 46 -2,1, 1,2,3,3,3,3,3,3 71 3,1, 1,1,1,3,3,3,3,3 
22 - 3,1, 1,1,1,1,2,3,3,2 47 - 3,1, 1,1,2,3,2,3,3,3 72 -1, 1, 1,1,1,1,3,3,3,3 
23 -2,1, 1,1,1,1,2,3,3,3 48 -1,1, 1,1,1,1,3,1,1,2 73 -3,1, 1,2,3,3,2,3,3,3 
24 -3,1, 1,1,2,3,3,2,3,3 49 -2,1, 1,1,2,1,2,3,2,3 74 -2,1, 1,1,1,1,3,3,3,3 
25 -3,1, 1,1,1,1,1,2,2,3 50 -2,1, 1,1.2,3,1,2,3,3 75 -2,1, 1,1,1,2,3,3,3,3 
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TABLE A6 
CHOICES OF SUBJECTS 
Experiment 8 [Pr of Y = .10] 
1 - , 1,1,1,1,1,1,2,2 26 - 1, 1, 1,1,1,1,1,3,2,3 51 - 1, 1, 1,1,1,1,2,3,3,3 
2 -2,1, 2,3,31,1,1,3,2 27 -3,1, 1,1,1,1,1,2,2,3 52 -3,1, 1,1,1,1,1,3,3,3 
3 -1,1, 1,1,1,1,1,1,2,2 28 -2,1, 1,1,1,1,1,2,3,3 53 -3,1, 1,1,1,1,1,3,3,3 
4 -3,1, 1,1,1,2,3,1,2,3 29 -2,1, 1,1,1,1,1,2,3,3 54 -2,1, 1,1,1,1,1,3,3,3 
5 -3,1, 1,1,21,3,3,2,3 30 -1,1, 1,1,1,1,1,2,3,3 55 -1,1, 1,1,1,1,2,3,3,3 
6 -2,1, 1,1,1,1,1,1,2,2 31 -3,1, 1,1,1,1,1,3,3,3 56 -3,1, 1,1,1,1,2,3,3,3 
7 -1,1, 1,1,11,1,1,3,3 32 -3,1, 1,1,1,1,2,3,2,3 57 -2,1, 1,1,1,2,3,3,3,3 
8 -3,1, 1,1,1,3,2,3,3,3 33 -2,1, 1,1,1,1,1,1,1,2 58 -2,1, 1,1,1,1,3,3,3,3 
9 -1,1, 1,1,1,1,1,2,3,3 34 -1,1, 1,1,1,1,1,3,3,3 59 -1,1, 1,1,1,1,2,3,3,3 
10 -2,1, 1,1,1,1,1,1,1,3 35 -1,1, 1,1,1,1,2,3,3,3 60 -3,1, 1,1,1,1,2,3,3,3 
11 -1,1, 1,1,1,1,1,3,3,2 36 -1,1, 2,3,3,3,3,3,3,3 61 -1,1, 1,1,1,2,3,2,3,3 
12 -3,1, 1,1,1,1,1,1,3,3 37 -3,1, 1,j,1,1,1,2,3,3 62 -2,1, 1,1,1,1,3,3,3,3 
13 -3.1, 1,1,1,1,1,3,3,2 38 -2,1, 1,1,1,1,1,1,3,2 63 -2,1, 1,1,1,1,3,3,3,3 
14 -2,2, 1,1,1,1,1,1,1,3 39 -2,1, 1,1,1,1,1,3,3,3 64 -3,1, 1,1,1,1,3,3,3,3 
15 -2,1, 1,1,1,2,1,3,3,3 40 -1,1, 1,1,1,1,2.3,3,3 65 -1,1, 1,1,1,3,3,3,3,3 
16 -1,1, 1,1,1,1,1,2,3,3 41 -3,1, 1,1,1,1.1,3,3,2 66 -3,1, 2,2,3,3,3,3,3,3 
17 -3,1, 2,1,2,1,3,3,3,3 42 -3,1, 1,1,1,1,2,3,3,3 67 -1,1, 1,1,1,1,3,3,3,3 
18 -2,1, 2,3,1,3,2,3,2,3 43 -2,1, 1,1,2,3,3,3,3,3 68 -2,1, 1,1,1,1,1,1,3,3 
19 -2,1, 1,1,1,1,1,1,1,2 44 -2,2, 1,1,1,1,1,1,3,3 69 -1,1, 1,1,1,1,3,3,3,3 
20 -3,1, 2,2,3,3,3,3,3,3 45 -1,1, 1,1,1,1,1,1,3,3 
21 -2,1, 1,1,1,1,1,1,3,3 46 -3,1, 1,1,1,1,1,2,3,3 
22 -1,1, 1,1,1,1,1,2,2,3 47 -1,1, 1,1,1,1,1,2,3,3 
23 -3,2, 1,1,1,1,1,3,3,3 48 --2,1, 1,1,1,1,1,3,2,3 
24 -2,1, 2,2,3,3,3,3,3,3 49 -2,1, 2,3,3,3,3,3,3,2 
25 -3,1, 1,2,3,3,3,3,3,3 50 -3,2, 1,1,1,1,1,3,3,3 
TABLE A7 
CHOICES OF SUBJECTS 
Experiment 9 [Pr of Y = .00] 
1 -1,1, 1,1,1,2,3,2,3,2 26 -3,1, 1,2,3,1,3,3,2,3 51 -3,1, 2,3,3,3,3,3,3,3 76 -3,1, 1,1,1,1,1,1,1,2 
2 -2,1, 3,2,1,3,3,2,2,2 27 -2,1, 1,3,3,2,3,2,3,3 52 -2,1, 1,3,1,1,1,1,1,3 77 -1,1, 3,1,1,3,1,2,3,2 
3 -2,1, 1,1,2,2,3,3,3,3 28 -1,1, 3,1,3,1,3,3,3,3 53 -2,1, 3,2,3,3,3,3,3,2 78 -2,1, 1,1,1,1,3,1,2,3 
4 -3,1, 2,3,3,2,3,2,2,3 29 -3,1, 3,1,3,3,2,2,3,2 54 -3,1, 1,1,1,1,1,1,1,3 79 -3,1, 1,1,1,1,1,1,1,3 
5 -1,1, 3,1,1,2,2,3,3,2 30 -2,1, 1,2,2,2,3,3,3,2 55 -2,1, 2,3,3,3,3,3,3,3 80 -1,1, 1,1,2,3,1,2,3,3 
6 -2,1, 2,3,2,1,3,3,3,3 31 -2,1, 2,3,3,3,2,3,3,3 56 -1,1, 1,1,3,2,3,3,3,3 81 -2,1, 1,1,1,3,1,1,2,3 
7 -3,1, 2,2,3,3,3,2,3,3 32 -1,1, 1,3,3,3,3,2,3,2 57 -2,1, 1,3,1,1,1,1,3,3 82 -3,1, 1,1,1,1,1,1,3,2 
8 -2,1, 2,3,3,3,1,1,3,2 33 -1,1, 1,1,2,3,3,3,3,3 58 -3,1, 3,1,3,1,3,3,2,3 83 -1,1, 1,1,1,2,3,3,3,3 
9 -3,1, 1,2,3,1,3,2,2,3 34 -2,1, 1,1,3,1,3,3,3,3 59 -2,1, 1,1,1,1,1,1,3,2 84 -3,1, 1,1,1,1,1,3,2,3 
10 -1,1, 1,1,2,3,3,3,3,3 35 -2,1, 1,3,3,3,3,3,3,2 60 -1,1, 1,1,2,3,3,3,3,1 85 -2,1, 1,1,1,1,1,1,2,3 
11 -1,1, 1,1,2,2,1,3,3,3 36 -3,1, 3,1,3,1,3,3,3,3 61 -1,1, 1,1,2,3,1,3,2,3 86 -1,1, 3,1,1,1,1,3,3,3 
12 -2,1, 1,1,1,3,3,3,2,2 37 -1,1, 1,2,3,3,3,3,2,2 62 -2,1, 3,1,1,1,1,1,1,3 87 -2,1, 1,1,1,1,1,1,2,3 
13 -3,1, 2,3,3,1,1,2,2,3 38 -1,1, 1,1,3,3,3,3,3,3 63 -3,1, 1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1 88 -3,1, 1,1,1,3,1,2,3,3 
14 -2,1, 1,1,1,3,1,3,3,3 39 -3,1, 1,3,2,3,3,3,3,2 64 -2,1, 1,1,1,1,1,1,1,2 89 -2,1, 1,1,1,1,1,1,3,3 
15 -3,1, 2,3,3,3,3,3,3,1 40 -3,1, 1,2,3,3,3,3,3,3 65 -2,1, 1,1,1,1,1,1,2,1 90 -1,1, 1,1,1,1,1,1,2,3 
16 -1,1, 1,1,2,3,3,2,2,3 41 -2,1, 2,2,3,2,2,3,2,3 66 -1,1, 1,1,1,3,2,2,3,3 
17 -3,1, 3,1,2,1,2,3,1,1 42 -1,1, 1,3,3,3,3,3,2,3 67 -3,1, 3,1,1,1,3,3,2,3 
18 -1,1, 1,3,3,1,2,3,2,2 43 -1,1, 2,2,1,3,3,2,3,3 68 -2,1, 1,1,1,1,1,1,1,3 LEGEND 
19 -2,1, 1,2,1,2,3,3,3,2 44 -3,1, 2,3,2,3,3,3,2,3 69 -1,1, 2,3,3,3,3,3,2,3 
20 -2,1, 1,2,1,3,3,3,3,3 45 -2,1, 2,3,3,3,3,3,3,3 70 -3,1, 1,1,1,1,1,1,1,3 lst number= round 
21 -1,1, 1,1,2,3,3,2,3,3 46 -3,1, 3,3,3,3,3,2,3,2 71 3,1, 1,1,1,1,1,1,2,3 2nd number= E'snumber 
22 -3,1, 2,3,1,3,3,3,3,2 47 -3,1, 2,3,3,3,3,3,2,3 72 -1,1, 1,1,2,3,3,1,2,3 3rd number= E's type(1 = X) 
23 -1,1, 1,2,1,3,3,2,2,3 48 -2,1, 2,2,2,3,3,3,3,3 73 -1,1, 1,1,1,2,1,3,3,3 4-1 numbers=roundchoices: 
24 -2,1, 1,2,3,2,2,3,3,3 49 -3,1, 2,1,2,3,3,3,3,3 74 -2,1, 1,1,1,1,3,1,2,3 1 = loan, payback; 
25 -3,1, 2,3,3,1,3,3,3,2 50 -1,1, 1,1,1,1,3,3,1,1 75 -3,1, 1,1,1,1,1,1,3,3 2=loan,renege; 3=noloan. 
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TABLE A8 
CHOICES OF SUBJECTS 
Experiment 10 [Pr of Y = .00] 
1 -3,1, 3,3,3,3,3,1,3,3 26 -3,1, 1,1,1,1,3,3,3,3 51 -3,1, 1,1,1,2,3,3,3,3 76 -2,1, 1,2,3,3,3,3,3,3 
2 -3,1, 1,1,1,1,3,1,2,3 27 -1,1, 1,1,1,1,3,3,1,1 52 -3,1, 1,1,1,1,1,3,3,3 77 -2,1, 1,1,1,3,2,3,3,3 
3 -1,1, 3,1,1,1,2,1,2,2 28 -2,1, 1,1,1,1,1,1,3,3 53 -1,1, 1,1,1,3,1,3,3,3 78 -1,1, 1,1,1,3,3,3,3,3 
4 -3,1, 1,1,3,1,1,3,3,2 29 -2,1, 1,1,1,1,1,3,3,3 54 -2,1, 1,1,2,3,3,3,3,3 79 -3,1, 1,1,3,3,3,3,3,3 
5 -2,1, 1,3,1,3,3,2,3,3 30 -1,1, 1,1,1,3,1,3,3,3 55 -1,1, 1,1,1,2,3,3,1,3 80 -1,1, 1,1,2,3,3,3,3,3 
6 -1,1, 1,1,1,1,3,3,3,3 31 -3,1, 1,1,1,1,3,3,3,2 56 -3,1, 1,1,1,1,3,3,3,3 81 -3,1, 1,1,3,3,1,3,3,3 
7 -1,1, 1,1,1,3,3,3,3,3 32 -2,1, 1,1,1,3,3,2,2,3 57 -2,1, 1,1,2,3,3,3,3,3 82 -3,1, 1,1,2,3,3,3,3,3 
8 -2,1, 1,1,1,1,1,3,3,3 33 -1,1, 1,1,1,1,1,1,3,3 58 -2,1, 1,1,1,3,3,3,2,3 83 -1,1, 1,1,1,3,3,3,3,3 
9 -2,1, 1,1,1,2,3,2,3,3 34 -2,1, 1,1,1,2,3,3,3,2 59 -1,1, 1,1.1,1,3,3,3,3 84 -2,1, 1,1,2,3,3,3,3,3 
10 -1,1, 1,1,1,1,3,3,3,3 35 --3,1, 1,1,1,3,2,3,3,3 60 -3,1, 1,1,1,2,3,1,3,3 85 -1,1, 1,1,1,3,3,3,3,3 
11 -2,1, 1,1,2,3,3,3,3,3 36 -3,1, 1,1,1,1,3,3,3,3 61 -1,1, 1,1,1,2,3,3,3,3 86 -3,1, 1,2,3,3,3,3,3,3 
12 -3,1, 1,1,1,3,1,3,2,3 37 -1,1, 1,1,1,1,1,3,3,3 62 -2,1, 1,1,2,3,3,3,3,3 87 --2,1, 1,1,3,3,3,3,3,3 
13 -3,1, 1,1,1,1,3,1,3,3 38 -2,1, 1,2,1,3,3,3,3,3 63 -3,1, 1,1,1,1,1,3,3,3 88 -1,1, 1,1,2,3,3,3,3,3 
14 -2,1, 1,1,1,3,2,3,3,2 39 -2,1, 1,1,2,3,3,3,3,3 64 -2,1, 1,1,1,3,3,2,3,3 89 -1,1, 1,1,3,3,3,3,3,3 
15 -1,1, 1,1,1,3,3,1,3,3 40 -2,1, 1,1,2,3,3,3,3,3 65 -3,1, 1,1,1,2,2,3,3,3 90 -3,1, 1,2,3,3,3,3,3,3 
16 -2,1, 3,1,1,1,3,2,3,3 41 -1,1, 1,1,1,1,1,2,3,3 66 -1,1, 1,1,1,1,3,3,3,3 91 -1,1, 1,3,3,3,3,3,3,3 
17 -3,1, 1,3,1,1,3,3,3,3 42 --1,1, 2,3,3,3,3,3,1,3 67 - 1,1, 1,1,1,3,2,3,3,3 92 -3,1, 2,3,3,3,3,3,3,3 
18 -3,1, 1,1,1,3,1,3,3,3 43 -2,1, 1,1,1,2,3,2,3,3 68 -2,1, 1,1,2,3,3,3,3,3 93 -1,1, 1,2,3,3,3,3,3,3 
19 - 1,1, 3,1,1,1,1,3,3,3 44 -1,1, 1,1,1,3,3,3,1,3 69 -3,1, 1,1,1,3.3,3,3,3 94 -2,1, 1,2,3,3,3,3,3,3 
20 -2,1, 1,3,1,1,1,3,3,3 45 -3,1, 1,1,1,1,2,3,3,3 70 -2,1, 1,2,3,3,3,3,3,3 95 -1,1, 1,1,3,3,3,3,3,3 
21 -1,1, 1,1,1,1,1,3,3,3 46 -) ,1, 1,1,2,2,3,3,3,3 71 -1,1, 1,1,1,1,3,3,3,3 96 -1,1, 1,1,3,1,3,3,3,3 
22 -2,1, 1,1,1,1,3,3,3,3 47 -3,1, 1,1,1,3,1,3,1,3 72 -2,1, 1,1,1,3,3,3,3,3 97 --3,1, 1,1,3,3,3,3,3,3 
23 -1,1, 1,1,1,1,1,1,3,3 48 -1,1, 1,1,1,3,1,3,3,3 73 -3,1, 1,1,1,3,3,3,3,3 98 -2,1, 1,2,3,3,3,3,3,3 
24 -3,1, 1,1,1,1,3,2,3,3 49 -2,1, 1,1,1,1,3,3,3,3 74 -2,1, 1,1,2,3,3,3,3,3 99 -3,1, 3,3,1,1,3,3,3,3 
25 -3,1, 1,1,1,1,3,3,3,3 50 -1,1, 1,1,1,3,3,3,3,3 75 -1,1, 1,1,1,2,3,3,3,3 00 -1,1, 1,1,3,3,2,3,3,3 
01 -1,1, 1,1,1,3,3,3,3,3 
APPENDIX B: EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURE AND INSTRUCTIONS 
Reading Instructions 
After the subjects have checked the contents of their folders, the instructions were read aloud. This 
ensured that the instructions, and stated parameters were "common knowledge" to all subjects, which 
is especially important in this experiment because a little spark of uncertainty (about what others 
know) can start reputation-building, over which you have no experimental control. Reading written 
instructions also allows the experimenter to use a standardized format, thus preventing biases and 
demand effects that can be created in an informal, ad libbed, explanation of procedure. The following 
is the set of instructions we used. Comments in brackets [ ] explain physical actions of the 
experimenters. All the diagrams and Record and Profit Sheets that are referred to in the instructions 
are available from the authors. 
Instructions 
This is an experiment in decision making. Various research foundations have provided funds for 
this research. The instructions are simple and if you follow them carefully and make good decisions, 
you can earn a considerable amount of money which will be paid to you in cash. [At this point, the 
experimenter pulls out a wad of money from an envelope, and hold it up so all the subjects could see 
the cash, to reinforce the reality of the monetary rewards.] 
General Instructions 
Each decision maker has been randomly assigned to be a member of the A group, or a member of 
the B group. Members of the A group have an "A" marked on their folders, along with a number (for 
example, A 2). Group A players will remain in this room (the "A room") during the experiment. 
Group B members have a "B" marked on their folders, and a number (for example, B3). Group B 
players will sit in a different room (the "B room") across the hall. [The experimenter then announces 
the number of the "B room"-e.g. Room 307.] One experimenter will be in each room, and the 
experimenters will communicate with each other by speaking and listening on walkie-talkies. 
In this experiment, there will be several sequences of decision rounds. Each sequence consists of 
eight decision rounds. Each round is a choice by one A player, followed by a choice by a B player. 
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How Players are Selected 
A single B player will be chosen before each sequence of rounds, to make choices in all eight 
rounds in that sequence. Which B player will be chosen in a specific sequence has been prede- 
termined by a random selection process. For instance, if the number 1 is assigned to a sequence, then 
player BI is the player who will make all the choices in the eight rounds in that sequence. 
In each sequence of rounds, each of the eight A players will make a choice in one of the decision 
rounds. Which player makes a choice in which round has been predetermined by a random number 
selection process. [In our pilot experiments we used another bingo cage to determine the ordering of 
A players. This proved to be very time consuming, so we predetermined the ordering before the 
experiment. After several sequences, subjects could see that the ordering appeared random, and they 
did not seem concerned that we had pre-ordered.] 
Choices in Each Decision Round 
In each decision round, the A player will make the first choice. The A player can choose either Al 
or A 2. The A player in each round must record his or her choice on the "A Player Information and 
Record Sheet" [the experimenter holds up a sample copy of this sheet] and that choice will be 
recorded on the blackboards in both the A room and the B room. 
After A's choice is announced to the B players in the B room by walkie-talkie, the B player who 
has been chosen to make the choices in all eight rounds of that sequence must make his or her choice. 
The B player can choose either Bi or B 2. The B player must record that choice on the "B Player 
Information and Record Sheet" [the experimenter holds up a sample copy of this sheet], and that 
choice will be recorded on the blackboards in both the A room and the B room. After the B player's 
choice is made, the decision round is concluded, and players will record their earnings on the 
appropriate Information and Record Sheets. Then we will proceed to the next decision round. Do not 
discuss your choice with other players between rounds, or at any time during the experiment. You 
should not speak to any other player during the experiment. After a sequence of eight decision rounds 
are concluded, we proceed to the next sequence. [The experimenter then asks if there are any 
questions regarding this section.] 
Earnings From Choices 
In a particular decision round, the earnings to each participating player depend on the choices of 
both the A player and the B player. You only receive earnings if you make a choice in that decision 
round. 
In this experiment, all earnings are in terms of "francs." Each franc is worth $0. XX [a specific 
number is given here, but not read aloud-instead, we say "some number"] to you. This number is 
your own private information and you are not to reveal it to anyone. At the end of the experiment, 
your francs will be converted to dollars and paid to you in cash. [The conversion rate can be 
considered as a balancing act. While you want to provide subjects with a large enough monetary 
incentive so they consider the experiment "worthwhile," you want to run as many experiments as 
possible, and thus don't want to waste your limited resources. One result of this is that it is always 
better to err on the low side. It is much easier to give subjects "bonuses" at the end of the experiment 
(e.g. -for filling out the questionnaires) than to try explaining to subjects why you want to only give 
them part of their earnings. Generally, the best method for determining a conversion rate is to 
calculate the subjects' expected value. For example, the expected value of the A players in 
experiments 3, 4, 5 was $15.48. This was derived by calculating the A players' expected value when the 
B player's type was X (and multiplying this by .667), when the B's player type was Y (and 
multiplying this by .333), adding these totals together, then multiplying by the expected number of 
sequences, and dividing by 8. It should be noted that this expected value calculation is subject to the 
law of large numbers, and it is quite possible that some A players may receive bad random draws 
(e.g., have many of their scheduled periods late in the sequences). The B players' expected earnings 
were calculated in a parallel fashion. In this experiment it was important hat both A and B players 
received similar earnings, because their exchange rates were necessarily different, to balance expected 
earnings. After the experiment, players of both types tend to ask each other how much they earned, 
and they get upset (harming goodwill and making future recruiting difficult) if their figures are 
systematically different. Our mean payoff for the experiments was $207.00, with a high payoff of 
$228.00, and a low payoff of $188.00.] 
The possible earnings, which depend on the choices of the A and B players, are best shown in a 
diagram written on the blackboard [the experimenter would point to a diagram like Figure 1 in the 
text]. We shall explain them as well. 
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[The experimenter now walks to where the diagram is drawn on the blackboard.] The A player 
choosing first, may consider Al or A 2. [He points to A 's decision node.] If the player chooses Al, then 
the B player has no choice, and both players earn 10 francs. [The experimenter traces the Al decision 
branch.] If the A player chooses A-2, then the B player must make a choice. [The experimenter traces 
the A2 decision branch to B's decision node.] If the B player chooses BI, the A player earns 40 
francs. If the B player chooses B2, the A player loses 100 francs. [Both B2 decision branches are 
traced.] 
The earnings of the B player are slightly more complicated. If the A player chooses Al, then the B 
player has no choice, and the B player earns 10 francs. [The Al decision branch is traced again.] If 
the A player chooses A2, then the B player has a choice-either Bi or B2 [the experimenter traces 
along the A 2 branch from A's decision node to B's decision node.] If the B player chooses Bl, then 
the B player receives 60 francs. [The Bi node is traced.] But if the B player chooses B2, the B 
player's earnings depends upon what " type" of earnings the B player has. 
Remember that a single B player is chosen by random drawing to make all eight choices in a 
specific sequence. After that player is announced, a bingo cage is used to determine what -type of 
earnings that B player will receive. [The experimenter goes to a second blackboard diagram showing 
the bingo cage structure.] The bingo cage contains 3 balls [for experiments 3-5, 10 balls for 
experiments 6-8, and there is no bingo cage for experiments 9-10] numbered 1 through 3. If a ball 
numbered 1 or 2 is drawn, the B player has "type X" earnings, and whichever B player has been 
selected to choose in that sequence should record an "X" next to "Type" at the top of their "B 
Player Information and Record Sheet." [The experimenter holds up the "B Player Information and 
Record Sheet," showing where the "Type" space is.] If a ball numbered 3 is drawn, the B player has 
"type Y" earnings, and the B player should record a "Y" next to "Type" at the top of their "B 
Player Information and Record Sheet." [The experimenter again holds up the "B Player Information 
and Record Sheet."] The outcome of this drawing to determine what type of earnings the B player 
has will be announced in the B room, but not in the A room. (However, after a sequence of eight 
decision rounds is concluded, then we will announce which type of earnings the B player had, to 
everyone in the A room.) 
[The experimenter walks back to the decision tree.] Assume the A player has chosen A 2 and the B 
player has chosen B2 [these branches are followed to their terminal nodes]. Then the B player earns 
150 francs if he or she has type X earnings, and the B player earns 0 francs if he or she has type Y 
earnings. Notice that for all other patterns of choices-for instance, if the A player chooses an Al, or 
if the A player chooses A2 and the B player chooses Bl -type X and type Y earnings are identical 
for B players. [While reading this last sentence, the experimenter traces these branches to their 
terminal nodes.] 
The pattern of potential earnings, depending upon the choices which the A player and the B 
player make, is shown in the diagram on the blackboard. [The experimenter points to the diagram 
again.] 
Total Earnings From the Experiment 
At the end of the experiment, total your earnings from all the sequences, on your "Profit Sheet." 
[The experimenter holds up an A player and a B player profit sheet.] Group A players will have made 
a choice in one round in each sequence. Group B players will have made eight choices, in each round 
of a sequence, in several different sequences. 
Record the total profit from all your choices, in francs, in row Tl of your profit sheet. [The 
experimenter holds up a profit sheet and points to row Tl.] Multiply this total by the number of 
dollars per franc in row T2 of the Profit Sheet [he points to row T2], and record the total dollars 
profit in row T3. [He points to row T3.] This amount will be paid to you in cash at the end of the 
experiment. You are free to earn as much as you wish in the experiment. 
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